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An overview of the thesis and some related
literature
1 Introduction
During the 1990s a number of countries (e.g. Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom) have introduced an inflation target as a cornerstone of their
monetary policy.l Moreover, by January 1 1999 the European Central Bank took
over for the 11 national central banks'' and at the end of March 2002 the Euro will
have replaced the national currencies the participating countries. These events have
been part of the motivation for my interest in monetary policy and consequently
also for this thesis.
The thesis focuses both on the credibility of the monetary policy target - i.e.
on the ability of the monetary policy institution to deliver a nominal anchor for the
medium and long run, and on the short run effects of the monetary policy set-up
on macroeconomic variables such as the rate of inflation, the rate unemployment
and output. Moreover, the thesis discusses the use of monetary policy rules and,
in particular, rules related to inflation targeting. Alexander et al. (1997) point
out that there is a global consensus of three main elements as far as the choice
of monetary target is concerned. The first relates to the need for medium-term
lSee e.g. McCallum (1996) for a description of the inflation targeting arrangements in the
different countries.
:lIn early January this year Greece also joined the European Monetary Union, which henceforth
includes 12 of the 1.'5countries in the European Union. Denmark, Sweden and the UK have thus
far not joined.
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objective or nominal anchor; the second relates to the need for commitment; and
the third relates to the types of frameworks that can be used to obtain price stability.
The latter refers to four different choices of targets for monetary policy, namely a
direct inflation target, an indirect monetary target, an exchange rate target, and a
nominal income target.
2 Institutions for monetary policy credibility
This line of research was initiated by the path-breaking article of Kydland and
Prescott (1977), which has later been popularized and extended by Barro and Gor-
don (1983a,b). The major implication ofthis analysis is that there will be a so-called
inflationary bias - i.e. the rate of inflation will be higher than the inflation goal of
the monetary authorities - while expected output is unaffected. This follows from
the fact that the monetary authorities cannot commit themselves to an inflation
rule. Once the inflation expectations are formed, the authorities will have an incen-
tive to deviate from the announced policy in order to bring output closer to the goal.
The market will foresee this, and expect a higher inflation than the policy goal.3
This simple model is extended in the literature in several directions", but I
concentrate on the literature on building monetary policy institutions. Following
Persson and Tabellini (1997:pp32) this literature can be divided into three closely
:'Calvo (1978) stresses the importance of market inefficiencies for this results. It is because of
market inefficiencies that the monetary authority has a higher goal for output than the natural
level.
4The extensions include the use of repetition to prove their credibility, see e.g. Barro and
Gordon (1983b). The idea is that if the government also cares about subsequent periods, it will
weigh the benefit of a surprise inflation today against the cost of a higher expected inflation in the
future. Consequently, reputation will reduce average inflation.
A natural extension of this is to include monitoring problems, so that the public cannot be
sure jf the high inflation is a result of some unobservable shock or a deliberate public policy (see
Canzeroni (1985)). This leads to temporary increases in actual and expected inflation.
Another extension is discussed by Backus and Driffill (198.5), Barro (1986) and Tabellini (1985,
1987). They assume that the public is uncertain about the policy-maker's type - i.e. about their
attitude towards inflation and unemployment.
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related branches. The first one is the discussion about fixed exchange rate regimes
and escape clauses. The former is related to the idea that a country can borrow
credibility from abroad by pegging its currency to a low inflation currency, while
the latter is related to the discussion about the use of fixed rules (like the fixed
exchange rate) with an explicit or implicit escape clause. The monetary authorities
then stick to a fixed rule in normal times when the output is close to the target,
but use discretionary policy - i.e. surprise inflation - in exceptional times. Flood
and Issard (1988) show that an escape clause is always better than the discretionary
outcome; and if the variance of the supply shocks are large enough, it is also better
than a simple rule (a completely fixed exchange rate).
The second branch is the discussion about whether to appoint a conservative
central banker. This was first suggested by Rogoff (1985), and the idea is to choose
a central banker who puts a lower weight on the output goal than the society does.
This will reduce the inflationary bias. However, the reduction in the inflation bias
only comes at a cost, since the stabilization of shocks will be distorted. Neverthe-
less, Rogoff (op.cit.) shows that appointing a "slightly" conservative central banker
will reduce expected costs, but it will not be optimal to reduce the inflation bias
altogether."
Finally, the fourth branch is the discussion about central bank contracts and
inflation targets. As far as the former is concerned, Walsh (1995) and Persson
and Tabellini (1993) use principal agent theory and argue that it is possible to
achieve monetary stability without giving up flexibility. The idea is to appoint an
independent CB and give it a performance contract. In their model the optimal
contract includes an additional linear cost of inflation in the objective function of
the CB, which will remove the inflationary bias, but not affect stabilization."
Svensson (1997b) proposes to interpret inflation targeting as a concept giving
5Lohman (1992) combines a conservative CB with escape clauses. The idea is that a partial
independent conservative central banker is chosen to conduct monetary policy, while the authorities
keep the option to renege upon the monetary policy chosen by the CB.
6Persson and Tabellini(op.cit.) extend the basic model and include the possibility of the CB
having private information, and to the situation where the CB does not control the monetary
target perfectly.
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the CB an explicit inflation target (and an implicit unemployment target and an
inflation/unemployment weight) different from the parameter in the social welfare
function. In the simple set-up, this will give the same result as the optimal contract
suggestion.
In a dynamic setting with employment persistence, Svensson (1997br demon-
strates that a discretionary policy will lead to a fourth-best outcome. In addition to
the average inflation bias, there will be a state-contingent inflation bias because in-
flation will depend on lagged employment; and, besides, there will be a stabilization
bias.
One may question the feasibility - and consequently also the relevance - of
both the optimal-contract and the explicit-inflation-target suggestion. As far as the
former is concerned, McCallum (1995) argues that such a set-up does not solve the
problem but merely relocates it. There is no reason to believe that the authorities ex
post will punish a monetary policy that is in line with their own preferences. Persson
and Tabellini (1997:33) argue that such a contract has to be formed in what they call
an "institutional stage", and it must be difficult to change it. However, McCallum
(1995) argues, despite the Constitution, the US "has not been on an operative
metallic standard for many years - since 1971, at the very least, or arguably since
1961, or 1933, or even earlier". As far as the latter is concerned, Persson and
Tabellini (1997:43) note that the inflation target itself will never be met. The
arrangement is such that the chosen inflation target plus the inflation bias will be
equal to the parameter in the social welfare function." Furthermore, in the case of
unemployment persistence, both the optimal CB contract and the optimal explicit
inflation target would have to be state-contingent, and the latter would mimic the
optimal rule solution only if it is combined with a Rogoff-independent central bank
(see Svensson 1997b). This makes both these suggestions much more difficult to
implement.
7Svensson (1997b) extends the work of amongst others Lockwood and Phillippopoulos (1994)
and Lockwood et al. (199S).
8A numerical example may be clarifying. Let the inflation target of the society be 2% and the
inflationary bias be 4%. The central banker should then have a target of -2%, which will lead to
an average of 2% inflation.
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2.1 Essay 1: Escape clauses in monetary policy with em-
ployment persistence
The dynamic setting with employment persistence is the starting point for the first
essay of the thesis, where I extend the analysis in Svensson (1997b) to include
an escape clause. Faced with the difficulties with implementing a state-contingent
central bank contract or the state-contingent inflation target, the escape clause
might be a promising candidate. The institutional set-up in this essay consists of i)
an independent Rogoff-conservative central banker, and ii) an escape clause. Policy
is conducted using a simple rule in normal times, i.e. setting inflation equal to the
goal, but the rule may be abandoned in the case where large shocks have hit the
economy.
In normal times the central bank has no discretionary power and cannot trade
off employment variations with variations in inflation. Consequently, compared to
discretionary monetary policy, employment will vary more and inflation will vary
less. Moreover, the set-up introduces a state-contingent peso-problem in normal
times. In the model by Flood and Issard (op.cit) the peso-problem was due to
the inflation bias. In exceptional times monetary policy will be biased against too
much inflation, while in normal times inflation is equal to the goal. Therefore, in
expected value, inflation will be higher than the goal as long as there is a positive
probability that the escape clause will be used. As a consequence, by setting inflation
equal to the goal in normal times, there will be a surprise deflation. In the model
discussed in this essay, the peso-problem will be state-contingent since expected
inflation depends on past employment. In a situation with low employment, the
expected inflation will be high since the authorities would choose a high rate of
inflation if they invoke the escape clause. As a result, the deflation surprise will
be large in normal times when inflation is set equal to the goaL The gain of the
escape clause is that monetary policy will be more effective when large shocks hit
the economy. In addition, employment persistence reduces in these situations.
11
2.2 Essay 2: The sources of German business cycles: how
important are permanent shocks?
The credibility literature is also the starting point of the second essay, where I look
at the sources of economic cycles in Germany. The German Bundesbank has often
been used as an example of an independent Rogoff-conservative central bank. As
pointed out above, choosing a conservative central banker will reduce the inflation
bias, but distort stabilization. However, the importance of the latter will depend on
what types of disturbances drive the economic cycles. As Svensson (2000) indicates,
even supply disturbances may increase the output potential as well as output, so in
fact the output gap and the rate of inflation move in the same direction. This will
then reduce the potential conflict following such disturbances.
The analysis is carried out using five quarterly variables for the German economy,
namely the rate of unemployment, GDP, the real exchange rate, CPL and a broad
measure of nominal money holdings - M3. These variables are chosen since they
are normally considered important for the conduct of monetary policy. I assume
that these variables are driven by five structural disturbances - four permanent and
one transitory, and the analysis is carried out by conducting a structural vector
autoregressive (SVAR) analysis. SVAR analysis has come to be a common tool in
analyzing business cycles and has proven to give information about the source of
fluctuations of macroeconomic variables. The strategy used in this paper to decom-
pose the different shocks followsShapiro and Watson (1988) to some extent, and the
identification is done using long-run restrictions." I have ordered the disturbances
as follows: Permanent labour shocks are defined as the only disturbances that have
a long-run impact on the rate of unemployment, thus they change the natural rate
of unemployment. Permanent output shocks do not have a long-run impact on un-
employment, but shifts the production frontier and will thus have a long-run impact
on GDP. Permanent real exchange rate shocks do not have a long-run impact on
neither unemployment nor on GDP, but may change the composition of GDP via
9This strategy was first used by Blanchard and Quah (1989) in their seminal article on the
sources of fluctuations in output and unemployment for the US.
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their long-run impact on the real exchange rate. Neither the permanent real money
shocks nor the transitory shocks have long-run impact on the unemployment and
output. In addition they do not change the real exchange rate in the long run. The
transitory shocks - in addition - are assumed not to have a long-run effect on real
money holdings. This set of restrictions then identifies the structural disturbances
and reveal how they affect the macroeconomic variables both contemporaneously
and through time.
The main result is that. the disturbances that. drive unemployment and output in
the long run also seem to be important factors for the business cycles. However, the
most important factor for the development of the unemployment and output gaps
seems to be disturbances that. have permanent effects on the rate of unemployment;
and since this disturbance drives the output gap and the price level in the same
direction, the potential conflict of monetary policy might be less.
3 Monetary policy rules and inflation targeting
A considerable amount of literature has been devoted to analyzing how different
monetary policy rule will work in stylized economic models. Large parts of this
literature have concentrated on the effects of inflation targeting. However, following
Leitemo (1999) there are two different interpret.at.ions of inflation targeting in the
literature. Batini and Haldane (1998) and McCallum and Nelson (1997) interpret
targeting as a simple rule, or, more precisely, as a forward-looking simple rule where
the policy instrument reacts to changes in the targeted variable - usually expected
inflation some point in the future. Svensson (see Svensson 1997a, 1999, and 2000)
on the other hand, interprets inflation targeting as discretionary optimization by an
independent central bank, which is given a certain object function.
There is often drawn a distinction between so-called strict or flexible inflation
targeting. The former corresponds to the situation where the Central Bank is only
concerned about the rate of inflation. Several studies point out that such policy may
lead to high variability in real variables such as output, the rate of unemployment or
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employment, and the real exchange rate. io The latter refers to a situation where the
central bank is also concerned about other variables than the rate of inflat.ion.l ' Such
set-ups seems to offer a better trade-off between inflation and output variability.
3.1 Essay 3: Tayloring the Norwegian interest rates
In his celebrated article, Taylor (1993) finds that his rule does a good job in tracking
the US short term interest rates. The Taylor-rule has thereafter been used both in
academics and practise to give statements about how the stance of monetary policy.
However, in the theoreticalliterature on inflation targeting it is often argued that the
central bank should focus on expected inflation.l'' In addition, empirical literature
have pointed out that actual central banks focus on expected infiation.l '
This is the starting point of the third essay in the thesis. The essay starts out
by motivating the Taylor rule using a model based on the targeting of expected
inflation developed by Svensson (1997a). It is shown that the Taylor rule might
serve as an instrument for targeting expected inflation if lagged output gap and
inflation serve to predict future inflation. Thereafter I compare the Taylor rule
with a forward-looking rule for the Norwegian economy. The main insight is that
both rules indicate a significantly different monetary policy than the actual one for
large periods. Besides, it seems that -- to some extent - the Taylor rule and the
forward-looking rule are different over the economic cycles. More precise, it seems
that the forward-looking rule increases earlier in economic booms and falls earlier
in economic recessions. Consequently, the Taylor rule might give a poor indication
10See e.g. Svensson (2000) for a comprehensive study of inflation targeting in an open economy.
Furthermore, the danger of large variations in the real exchange rate is pointed out by - among
others - Ball (1998).
11Batini and Haldane (1998) stress that the actual monetary policy rule does not need to include
other variables than the rate of inflation. However. concern about other variables will influence
the choice of horizon for the inflation target.
12See e.g. Svensson (1997a) for a theoretical justification for targeting expected inflation.
13Clarida and Gertler (1996) points out that the monetary policy strategy of the German Bun-
desbank corresponds well to a forward-looking rule, and Clarida et al. (1998) report a similar result
for the G3-countries - the US, Germany, and Japan.
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of monetary policy under inflation targeting when the economy goes in or out of
recessions or booms.
3.2 Essay 4: A monetary policy rule in practice: the case
of Norway
In the fourth essay of the thesis I estimate a forward-looking rule for the Norwegian
economy. The starting point is the articles by Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), where
they estimate monetary policy rules using forward-looking variables. In the former,
the analysis is done for two sets of countries. First, for the G3 economies --Germany,
Japan, and the US, and second, for three European economies - France, Italy, and
the UK. For the European economies the basic model is extended to include the
German short-term interest rate due to the fixed exchange rate regime. The latter
article discusses monetary policy in the US along the same lines, but the authors
also include a theoretical justification of the rule. The main idea is that the rule
has to offer a sufficiently aggressive reaction to expected inflation, and more precise,
the real interest rate must increase following an increase in expected inflation in
order to rule out self-fulfilling prophesies. Interestingly, the authors find that the
US monetary policy before the Volcker-Greenspan period implied the possibility of
self-fulfilling fluctuations in output and inflation.
The essay looks at the effect of pegging the Norwegian Krone to the European
currencies. I estimate a monetary policy rule for the period 1986 till 1992, taking
into account that the monetary authorities have followed a fixed exchange rate
regime. The main result is that the monetary policy set-up accommodated changes
in expected inflation in this period. Consequently, monetary policy did not. provide
a sufficient anchor for short or medium term expected inflation, which - as in the
case for the US before the Volcker period - may have led to self-fulfilling prophecies
about the development of the rate of inflation.
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3.3 Essay 5: Inflation targeting in a monetary union with
non-coordinated fiscal policy
So far I have discussed monetary policy issues without taking into account that in
most cases the central bank conducts its policy alongside with the fiscal authorities.
However, fiscal policy may influence both how monetary policy is conducted and the
extent to which monetary policy goals will and can be achieved. These problems have
been analyzed in the literature under the heading "coordination problems between
fiscal and monetary policy" .14
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) analyze such a monetary jfiscal game in the case
where fiscal policy is conducted by myopic governments. They show that compared
to a regime with decentralized monetary policy, a monetary union will increase the
accumulation of public debts. Beetsma and Bovenberg (2000) extend this analy-
sis and allow the participating countries to be heterogeneous. The result is that
debt target will have to be state-contingent. Andersen and Sørensen (1995) argue
that with imperfect competition in both product and labour markets, even balanced
fiscal policy may affect unemploymentY Consequently, this will imply that a re-
striction on the size of the public sector is necessary. The starting point of Dixit
and Lambertini (2000) is the debate on excessive use of fiscal policy to stabilize
business cycles. Their analysis is carried out in a Barro-Gorden model, which is
extended to a monetary union. The result is that as long as the central bank and
the fiscal authorities have the same goals for output and inflation, the first-best can
be achieved irrespective of whether the fiscal authorities move first or second and
whether the fiscal authorities cooperate or they do not. Additionally, there is no
need for monetary commitment.
The starting point of the last essay in the thesis are two important features of
the European Monetary Union. First, monetary policy is conducted by the Euro-
pean Central Bank, which is an independent institution with price stability as its
14Seee.g. Nordhaus (1994) for an overview of the literature.
10Nonetheless, in the union as a whole unemployment is unaffected and, as a result, the decrease
in the rate of unemployment in one country comes about through an increase in unemployment in
the rest of the countries.
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main objective. Second, fiscal policy is completely decentralized and is carried out
by the fiscal authorities in the participating countries. These factors will lead to a
strategic game in two dimensions. On the one hand, it. will imply strategic interac-
tions between the fiscal authorities seen as a group and the monetary authorities;
and, on the other hand, it will imply strategic interactions between the fiscal au-
thorities themselves. The last essay of the thesis discusses coordination problems in
a monetary union, where the central bank targets core inflation. It is shown that
lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal policy leads to a state-contingent
bias in the sense that the fiscal authorities react to changes in average core infla-
tion. Furthermore, lack of coordination between the fiscal authorities will lead to
a stabilization bias. As a result, the fiscal authorities do not react correctly to id-
iosyncratic shocks. The nature of the stabilization bias will depend on 'whether the
fiscal authorities act as Stackelberg leaders with the central bank or not.
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ESSAY 1:
Escape clauses in monetary policy with
employment persistence"
Abstract
The paper discusses the use of escape clauses in monetary policy when
there is employment persistence. The institutional set-up consists of i) an
independent conservative central banker. and ii) an escape clause. Poliey is
conducted using a simple rule in normal times, hut the rule may be abandoned
in the case where large shocks have hit the economy.
In normal times the central bank has no discretionary power and eannot
trade off employment variations with variations in inflation. Furthermore, the
set-up introduces a state-contingent peso-problem in normal times since ex-
pected inflation depends on past employment. The gain of the escape clause is
that monetary policy will be more effective when large shocks hit the economy.
In addition, employment persistence reduces in these situations.
'Thanks to Torben Andersen for comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyses the effects of escape clauses when there is employment persis-
tence. The latter is based on the stylized fact about the European labor market:
after a shock to employment, there seems to be little tendency to revert to the pre-
vious situation. Given these extensions I describe the development of employment
and inflation through time in the situation when the monetary authorities conduct
monetary policy in normal times based on a simple rule, but it has the option to
abandon the rule in situations where large shocks have hit the economy.
The study of escape clauses has been mostly related to the theoretical description
of fixed exchange rate regimes such as the Bretton Woods or the European Monetary
System (EMS). This institutional arrangements were characterized by stabilizing the
exchange rate in normal times and realignments in exceptional times. In their article
,.Monetary Policy Strategies" - where escape clause was first analyzed - Flood and
Issard (1988) do not limit the relevance to the fixed-exchange-rate set-up, but merely
justify the use of an escape clause in monetary policy as a way of solving parts of
the credibility problem.
It is interesting to note that studies on actual CB behavior observe that very
often the instrument of monetary policy can be well described by rather simple rules,
except in extraordinary circumstances. For example, Taylor (1993) notes that there
is a significant difference between his rule and the actual US short-term interest
rate in 1987 as the Federal Reserve eased monetary policy as a responce to the
crash in the stock market. And this is exactly what rules with escape clauses are
all about: following some simple rules in normal times, and discretionary policy in
exceptional times. In the set-up used in this paper, monetary policy is conducted
by an independent central bank which follows a simple rule except in extraordinary
circumstances. In such cases the central bank abandons the simple rule and uses its
knowledge and - important.ly - its own preferences to conduct monetary policy in a
discretionary manner.
In addition to the escape clause I assume that the central bank is Rogoff (1985)
conservative in the sense that it puts a lower weight on employment stabilization
22
than the rest of society. The implication of this is that when the simple rule is
abandoned, the central banker puts a higher weight on the inflation goal. This
can be justified by Alan Blinder's observation from his time in the Federal Reserve:
<<Rogoff(1985) observed that one way to offset the inflation bias is to install a quite
"conservative" person to lead the central bank... This, I believe, is common practice
around the world. Indeed, the noun "central banker" practically cries out for the
adjective "conservative"» (Blinder, 1997, 14). The institutional set-up therefore
consists of i) an independent. conservative central banker and ii) an escape clause.
The aim of this paper is thus positive rather than normative since these two factors
arguably are important. ingredients of how actual monetary policy is conducted.
I assume that the (long-run) natural employment coincides with the employ-
ment goal of the monetary authorities. This means that the average inflation bias
is ruled out by assumption, which is done out of two reasons: The first is analytical
tractability since it makes it easier to concentrate on the effect of employment per-
sistence; and the second is a more questionable one, namely that. it may be a bet ter
description of how an independent central banker acts. The assumption is hence
that the problems with inflation biases are not related to the long term goal of the
monetary authorities, but to the short - or medium - term goals for stabilizing out-
put (or employment). Alternatively, letting the goal of employment equal natural
employment may be justified by the assumption that the average inflation bias is
already taken care of by other institutional arrangements such as the linear central
bank contract.
The paper has a dynamic structure like in Svensson (1997)1, who shows that
a discret.ionary policy will lead to a fourth-best outcome in the case of persistent.
employment. In addition to the well-known average inflation bias, there will be a
state-contingent inflation bias because inflation will depend on lagged employment;
and, furthermore, there will be a stabilization bias in that inflation will vary too
much and employment too little. The reason for the latter is that the inflation bias
lSvensson (1997) extends the work of amongst others Lockwood and Phillippopoulos (1994)
and Lockwood et al. (1998). The latter discusses in detail the delegation of a conservative central
banker in the case of (unjemployment persistence.
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III the future will depend on current employment, which increase the gains from
stabilizing employment. Svensson then discusses several institutional set-ups which
remove some of these biases. A weight-conservative independent central bank as
suggested by Rogoff (1985) will - at best - secure a third-best outcome; a pure
inflation target secures a third-best outcome, and will therefore have the same effect
as the linear central bank contract as suggested by Persson and Tabellini (1993)
and Walsh (1995); and a state-contingent inflation target combined with a weight-
conservative central bank or state-contingent central bank contract secure a second-
best outcome.
This paper is organized as follows: In the second part the model economy is
described, including the preferences of the monetary authorities and how it differs
from the preferences of the government or society; and in the third part the escape
clause is discussed in the situation where employment persists. The fourth part
describes the numerical solution and the last part concludes.
2 The model economy
The analytical framework follows from Svensson (1997) and will thus be a Barro and
Gordon (1983) model, but the institutional framework include an escape clause.f
The short-run expectation augmented Phillips-curve relationship is assumed to be
given by
(1)
where Et is independently, identically normally distributed with zero mean. lt is (log
of) employment in period t, and I" is (long-run) natural employment. 1rt and 1r~ are
the actual and the expected rate of inflation in period t. The third term expresses
the idea that only surprise inflation will affect employment. The constant o: is the
slope of the Phillips-curve and it measures the marginal impact on unemployment of
a marginal increase in unexpected inflation. Furthermore, p measures employment
2The Barro-Gordon model is a popularization of the seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott
(1977).
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persistence and O::; P ::; 1. If p = O,past employment has no effects on the actual
employment, i.e. there is no persistence; if O< P < 1, there is persistence depending
on the size of p; and if p = 1, there is hysteresis and the actual rate of unemployment
will evolve as a random walk. I normalize the natural employment to zero and thus
the expectation-augmented Phillips-curve will be given by
(2)
The chosen employment dynamics will be important for the result. Following
Modery (1995: pp. 244) the theories explaining unemployment persistence can be
divided into five groups: First, unemployment persistence can be due to capital
shortage. The idea is that shocks that are adverse to the productivity of the capital
stock may lead to persistence in unemployment if capital and labor are complemen-
tary factors and if it takes time to build up the stock of capital. These theories
support a specification similar to the one which is included in the path-breaking
article Barro and Gordon (19K3): the natural rate of unemployment itself evolves
as a moving average depending on its own past. Second, unemployment persistence
can be due to human capital shortage. The idea is that the workers ability to work -
or more generally their human capital - will depreciate through time when they stay
unemployed. Together with wage-stickiness this may therefore lead to persistence
in employment. These theories suggest that unemployment will depend on past un-
employment; and the size of unemployment persistence will depend on the degree
of wage stickiness and the depreciation of the human capital. Third, unemployment
persistence can be due to discouraged workers. The idea is that the workers being
unemployed gradually make less effort to look for jobs. These theories also suggest
that unemployment will depend 011 past unemployment; and the size of persistence
will depend on how rapid the unemployed gets discouraged to look for jobs and on
wage flexibility. Fourth, unemployment persistence can be due to labor-turnover
costs. The idea is that the firms may be reluctant to hire workers due the lock-in
effect of the hiring and firing costs. These theories again relate to a specification
where unemployment is influenced by past unemployment. As far as the size of
unemployment persistence, it will depend on wage flexibility. Fifth, unemployment
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persistence can be due to insider-outsider behavior in the labor market. This is the
set-up discussed by Lockwood and Phillippopoulos (1994), which also is the start-
ing point in Lockwood et al. (1998). The idea is that wages are set in a bargain
between a labour union and the employers; where the former is assumed to have
both a employment and a wage target and tries to minimize deviations from these
goals. The employment goal is a convex combination of members - who were last
periods employed - and the labour force. Unemployment persistence will depend
on the relative weight put on the employment goal versus the wage target and the
weight put on the labour force relative to the union members.
The preferences of the monetary authorities is summarized by a cost function
VVi, which is a function of employment and inflation in each period. It is assumed to
be of the Barro and Gordon (1983)-type and thus a quadratic cost function, hence
(3)
where l* is the employment target and I have normalized the inflation target to zero.
The employment target is assumed constant through time and in general it might
be different from the natural rate of employment. This will introduce an average
inflationary bias. As shown by Svensson (1997), the average inflationary bias may
be ruled out by giving the central bank a target for inflation that is lower than the
social target or by a central bank contract, as suggested by Persson and Tabellini
(1993) and Walsh (1995). In order to concentrate on the effects of employment
persistence, I will let the employment goal be equal to the natural employment level.
This assumption might also be a better description of how actual central banks act.
Blinder (1997) and McCallum (1995) argue that central bankers do not try to push
employment above its natural level. The set-up in this model may therefore be seen
as taking a stand in the middle saying that central bankers may not try to push
employment above its natural level, but they will be tempted to surprise the market
with inflation (deflation) when employment is below (above) its long-run level due
to persistence.
The last parameter in the cost function is the weight on the employment goal, Nb.
I follow Rogoff (1985) and assume that the central banker is weight-conservative in
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the sense that A cb < A, where A is the employment weight of the society." This means
that the central banker cares less about variations in employment than the society
does; and as noted in the introduction, this can be justified by the observation of
Blinder (1997) from his time in the Federal Reserve, that choosing a conservative
central banker is a common practice. The result of this is that whenever the central
banker abandons the simple rule, it will inflate less for a given level of unemployment
than the government would do.
The monetary authorities - as well as society - are assumed to have an infinite
planning horizon and to minimize the discounted sum of per period costs, thus
mmimize
~ = Et [s~f3i-sWBl = Et [~/J-s~ (Jr; + ACbZ;) l
where f3 is the discount factor.
I assume that the central bank controls inflation directly, which may be seen as
(4)
a reduced form problem of one of the two following set-ups. In the first set-up -
which follows from Flood and Issard (1989) - the instrument of the central bank is
the monetary base bi and
(5)
Equation (5) is the relationship between inflation and the growth rate of the mon-
etary base, and 'Ut is the shock to this relat.ionship. The shock is uncorrelated with
the supply shock and it is observed by the central bank before it chooses bt. The
central bank therefore controls inflation by varying the growth rate of the monetary
base.
In the second set-up the central bank uses the nominal interest rate to influence
aggregate demand. A simple representation of aggregate demand - expressed in
terms of labour rather than output" - may be written as
l1 = plt-l -, (it - 7rD + Ut, (6)
3The preferences of the society - or the government - can be represented in the same way as
for the central bank; and the only difference is the weight on employment stabilization.
4This may be found using an aggregate demand function involving output and Okuu's law
relating output to employment.
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where the superscript d denoted demand, "( is a positive constant and (t is the de-
mand shock." it is the nominal interest rate and thus labour demand decreases with
the real interest rate. Equating aggregate demand (equation 6) with the expectation-
augmented Phillips-curve gives a function relating the rate of inflation to the nominal
interest rate:
Therefore, in the case the demand shock is observable by the central bank before it
chooses the nominal interest rate, the rate of inflation can be controlled setting the
corresponding nominal interest rate; and the model can be solved assuming that the
central bank controls the rate of inflation directly.
3 A simple escape clause with employment per-
sistence
A monetary policy regime with an escape clause is characterized by some rule in
normal times and discretionary policy in exceptional times. The former is defined as
the times when the shocks to unemployment fall within a determined interval, thus
between Er and E~. Exceptional times are defined as the complement of this, thus
as the times when the shocks fall outside the interval. Another possibility would be
to let the escape clause region be defined over some observable variable; and in this
case the rate of employment. There are, however, some drawbacks with such set-
ups. First, employment is an endogenous variable, which will make the specification
of the escape-clause region difficult. One possibility would be to specify the region
in terms of past employment, but this will be foolish in the sense that it will only
restrict the central bank in normal times with no gains in exceptional times. Another
possibility would be to specify the escape clause on what employment would be if
the central bank would have followed the simple rule. This variable would, however,
have to be calculated ex post using the" unobservable" employment shock and the
5The demand shock will be a composite of labour demand shocks and aggregate demand shocks.
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"unobservable" expected inflation; and, in practice, this would not always be an
easy task. The only reasonable set-up would therefore be to let the escape clause
be defined over some area in the two-dimensional (Et, lt_I)-space. This might then
be implemented by a fixed cost of abandoning the simple rule." Since the inflation
bias will be increasing in lagged employment, the escape clause region will be an
increasing function in the (Et, lt-l )-space. If, in addition to a fixed fee, there is a
political cost of sticking to the rule and this cost will be an increasing function
in lagged employment,' this will tend make the escape-clause region decreasing in
lagged employment. The one-dimensional escape-clause region might be interpreted
as an approximation to such a set-up.
I followFlood and Issard (1989) and assume that the interval is symmetric around
zero. This implies that the conditional expected value of the shock is zero, which will
make the model easier to solve. Lohman (1992) notes that in the case of an escape
clause without persistence and where the government has a different. employment
goal than the natural level, the optimal escape clause region will be symmetric
around a positive constant due to the existence of an (average) inflationary bias.
This has been shown analytically by Alexius (1999) for the case where the supply
shock has a uniform distribut ion." I have ruled out this bias, however.
6In a fixed exchange rate model, Obstfeld (199i) points out that such implementation might
lead to multiple equilibria. The reason is that expected inflation - or expected devaluation in
Obstfekl's model - depends on the probability that the simple rule is abandoned. At the same
time, the choice of whether or not to abandon the rule depends on expected inflation. An increase
in expected inflation will make it more costly to follow the simple rule, which make the probability
that the government abandons the rule higher; and a higher expected inflation may therefore
become self-fulfilling.
Flood and Marion (1998) discuss Obstfeld's results and note the following: First, recalculating
Obstfelds results using the normal distribution instead of the triangular distribution used by Ob-
stfeld, they find that an escape clause performs better than reported by Obstfeld. The reason is
that the triangular distribution cuts off the probability large shocks. Second, they point out that
the authorities should take the possibility of multiple equilibria into account when they choose the
fixed cost; and the loss of doing so is comparably small.
7This will be the case if the political pressure to abandon the rule is higher the further away
employment is from its natural level.
8She also show that in the case of a uniform distribution for the supply shock, there does not
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In the original suggestion by Flood and Issard (1989) the monetary authorities
set inflation equal to the target - 7ft= O- in normal times, and I followtheir set-up.
Using the base-money or the labour-demand management set-up above, the central
bank will then neutralize the 'Ut-shocksor the 'Ut-shocks;but the supply shocks are
not allowed to influence the rate of inflation.
The Flood and Issard (1989)-model is extended by Lohman (1992) where mon-
etary policy in normal times is conducted by a "weight-conservative" central bank,
and the government may renege upon monetary policy. To do so they must pay
a political fee, however, which will thus only be done if the shocks to employment
are large. The policy rule of the central banker will therefore be kinked. For small
shocks the central banker does not take into account the ex-post incentives of the
government to renege upon monetary policy; but for shocks that are above a thresh-
old, it will have to take into account the government's incentives, and monetary
policy will be closer to that of discretion the larger the shock hitting employment
is.9
The set-up m this paper differs from the above literature in important ways.
First, none of the contributions above consider employment persistence, which is an
essential ingredient of this paper. Second, in earlier studies the central bank con-
ducts monetary policy following the preferences of the government in exceptional
times, whereas I consider the situation where the central bank follows its own pref-
erences when they abandon the simple rule. Arguably, my set-up will be a better
description of some of the inflation-targeting central banks, which have the possibil-
ity to abandon the inflation target in special circumstances.l'' Furthermore, it might
also be argued that the US Federal Reserve may fit this description. Taylor (1993)
notes that the US monetary policy can be well described by his simple rule except
in extraordinary circumstances - such as the in 1987when the Fed eased monetary
policy due to the crash in the stock market.
exist multiple equilibria as in Obstfeld's model, where the shock has a triangular distribution ..
9Interestingly, even largely independent central banks such as the German Bundesbank and
the Dutch Central Bank had clauses in their laws providing the government to override monetary
policy in certain circumstances. See footnote 17 in Persson and Tabellini (1997).
lOSee e.g. McCallum (1996) for a description of inflation targeting in different countries.
Following Leitemo (1999) there are two different interpretations of inflation tar-
geting in the literature. Batini and Haldane (1998) and McCallum and Nelson
(1997) interpret targeting as a simple rule, or, more precisely, as a forward-looking
simple rule where the policy instrument reacts to changes in the targeted variable
- usually expected inflation some point in the future. Svensson (see Svensson 1997,
1999, and 2000) on the other hand, interprets inflation targeting as discretionary
optimization by an independent central bank, which is given a certain object func-
tion. The rule I consider is simple in the sense that the central bank is assumed
to set inflation equal to zero in each period; but spelled out as a rule involving
the central bank instrument, the rule will be a function of all the state variables.
Therefore, the rule will be associated to second interpret.at.ion of inflation targeting,
where the monetary authorities - in addition - have the option to abandon the rule
if the shock to employment is large enough. More precise, the rule is associated to
the regime known as strict inflation targeting, where the central bank is dictated to
care only about the rate of inflation. The intuition of this paper should hold also for
simple forward-looking rules, however, since these will also limit the central banker
from achieving an optimal trade-off between inflation and employment variability
following different shocks.
The optimal rule - for exceptional times - can be derived from the Bellman
equation:
(1 - q) Et-l [~ ().cb In + /1V (lt) l
+q~;pE~~1 [~ ( ( 7r~b) 2 + xcbl;) + ,av (It) l
(7)
where V (It-I) is the value function, thus the discounted expected future costs. Fur-
thermore, q is the probability that the shock falls outside the symmetric interval
[-E8, E8], and E8 and Ecb are the expectation operator over normal and exceptional
times, respectively. The minimization is done given the evolution of the labour
market, but the monetary authorities do not internalize the effect on expected in-
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flationY The first order condition will then be given by:
(8)
which can be interpreted as follows: The first two terms equate the case without
persistence (or with zero discount factor) and gives the trade-off between current
inflation and employment. The last part takes into account that future employment
will be affected because of employment persistence.
Due to the fact that the minimization problem is linear-quadratic and the escape
int.erval is given exogenously'<, the value function will be quadratic;
(9)
and thus the first-order condition can be written as
(10)
Taking the unconditional expected value of equation (10) gives:
En" + aX'b El + a/3 ('h + 12El) = O
Es'" = a/hl,
since unconditional expected employment. is zero. Since I have ruled out. the average
inflationary bias, unconditional expected inflation will have to be zero, and thus Il
will be zero. Therefore, the first order condition reduces to:
(11)
Assuming rational expectations, the expected inflation in exceptional times will
be given by13
E~~I7r~b(1 + a2 (ACb + lh2)) = a2 (ACb + fJ,2) 7re - a (ACb + fJ,2) plt-I
Ecb cb _ l .(\cb + (.I , ) ( lO l) (12)
t-l7rt - (1+ a2 (ACb + /3
,2
)) a /\ 1--'12 a7r - p t-l •
llSee Svensson (199i).
12If the escape-clause region would be endogenously given by a fixed cost, say, the value function
would include a value of waiting.
13Since the escape clause interval is symmetric. the expected value of the shock in exceptional
times will be zero.
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In normal times the central bank sets inflation according to the simple rule
(13)
and, thus, expected inflation - given" normal times" - will be zero.l" Therefore, the
expected inflation will be given by
(14)
Expected inflation will hence depend negativelyon the probability of exceptional
times and on past employment. The reason for the latter is that the central bank -
when exceptional times occurs - will choose a higher rate of inflation the lower the
employment is.
Using this and the expectation-augmented Phillips curve - equation (2) - em-
ployment in normal times can be written as:
(15)
There will be no trading-off between inflation and employment variability, and the
employment shock will only affect employment. In addition, employment persistence
will increase, since the term in the brackets will be higher than one if q > O. This is
due to the fact that expected inflation depends on past employment.
Using the first order condition - equation (11) - and expected inflation from
equation (14) gives
(16)
Following the notation in Svensson (op.cit.), I can 'write the decision rule for the
monetary authority in exceptional times as
'7T"cb - be r>["t - - tet - v (-1, (17)
14This follows from the fact that I have assumed a that there is a symmetric escape-clause region.
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where
b (18)
c (19)
This has the followingimplications for the policy rule in exceptional times: Com-
pared to the case without an escape clause - which is analyzed by Svensson (op.cit.)
- the stabilization parameter b is affected by the escape clause only through the
fact that "12 will depend on the probability parameter q. The reason is that the
central bank faces the same trade off between current employment and inflation as
in the case without an escape clause. Due to the fact that employment persists,
the central banker will also take into account how its choice of inflation will affect
future employment, however: and future employment is influenced by the fact. that
there is an escape clause. As far as the state-contingent bias -- the parameter c
in the reaction function - is concerned, it is affected by the escape clause in two
different ways. First, as for the stabilization parameter. the escape clause influences
the parameter through changes in "12' Second, the escape clause has a direct. effect.
through the fact that it lowers the expected inflation.
Employment in exceptional times will then be given by:
In exceptional times the monetary authorities have discretionary power and will
let the employment shock partly feed into employment and partly into inflation.
Furthermore employment persistence falls: as long as q < 1 the first fraction will be
less than one.
The escape-clause thus has the following effects on monetary policy: First, in
normal times, the central banker follows the simple rule and thus sets inflation
equal to zero. Since expected inflation depends on past employment - see equation
(14) - this will result in an inflationary surprise if employment is above the natural
level and a deflationary surprise if employment is below the natural level. This is
therefore related to the so-called Peso-problem; and since expected inflation depends
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on past employment due to employment persistence, there will be a state-contingent.
Peso-problem. The effect is that employment persistence increases. Second, in
exceptional times, the central banker has discretionary power. Since exceptional
times only occurs with probability less than one, expected inflation depends less on
past employment than in the discretionary set-up. The central banker will choose
a higher (dis)inflation the more employment is below (above) the natural level.
Therefore, employment persistence will fall in exceptional times.
In order to determine b and c, 12 must be found. This is done in the appendix,
where I also include an existence condition. Here I turn to a numerical solution of
the different parameters in the decision rule and look at how they depend on the
probability parameter q - hence on the size of the escape clause region, on how
conservative the central banker is (ACb) and on employment persistence p; and in
addition I look at how employment persistence in normal and exceptional times will
depend on q and A=. The aim of the next section is thus to characterize some general
features of the decision rule.
4 The numerical solution
The result of the numerical solution is shown III figures 1, 2 and 3.1[1 Figure 1
shows how the parameter b - the reaction to a supply shock in exceptional times
- depends on the probability q. the central bankers employment weight (ACb), and
employment persistence (p), respectively. It is seen that b increases with both p,
which is due to the fact that the gain of stabilization increases. The reason is that
employment - once it is away from the natural level - will stay away for a longer
time period. An increase in persistence, therefore, increases the expected discounted
cost of not meeting the employment goal this period. The figure also shows the result
of Lockwood et al. (1998) that delegating monetary policy to a conservative central
banker reduces stabilization. And since stabilization is too high if the government
conducts monetary policy itself (in a discretionary way) - there is a stabilization bias
15To do this I have used the following parameter values..o = O.L i3 = (1+ 0.07/4)-1, P = 0.9,
,\ = 1, and ,\cb = 0 ..5.
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Figure 1: b as a function of q, and Acb and p.
- choosing a central banker with an employment weight below A will reduce this bias.
The optimal response - the so-called commitment equilibrium - is given by b* =
AO/ (1+ A02 - (Jp2) (see Svensson op.cit). Therefore, lowering Acb will bring about
a gain due to lower stabilization bias as long as b > b* .16 Furthermore, the figure
shows that the parameter b is a U-shaped function of the probability-pararneter q,17
which implies that employment stabilization - in exceptional times - will be reduced
by introducing an escape clause; and this will be so both if the starting point is a
simple rule or discretionary policy by a conservative central banker.l'' I will return
to the explanation for the U-shape below.
Turning to the parameter c - the state-contingent bias - figure 2 shows how
this parameter depends on the q, Acb and p. An increase in p increases the state-
contingent bias since the gain from surprise inflation increases. The figure also show
16It will be optimal to choose even a lower ,\cb, even though this introduces a stabilization bias
(in the opposite direction) since there still will be a state-contingent bias.
17\Vithout employment persistence the parameter b will not be affected by changing the
probability-parameter q. The reason is that I have ruled out the average inflation bias, and
therefore expected inflation will be zero. The monetary authorities then face the same type of
problem if they abandon the simple rule irrespective of the parameter q.
181nthe case without employment persistence. Flood and Issard (1989) show that the mixed rule
(escape clause) always dominates discretion and also dominates the simple rule, if not the variance
of the shock hitting the economy is small and the average inflation bias is large.
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Figure 2: c as a function of q, and )..cb and p.
that choosing a conservative central banker decreases the state-contingent bias, as
demonstrated by Lockwood et al. (1998). However, in order to remove the this bias
altogether the central banker has to put zero weight on the employment goaL Last,
also the state-contingent bias is a U-shaped function of the probability parameter
q.19
The U-shape of b and c as a function of the probability parameter is due to two
different factors pulling in opposite directions. The first factor is related to the fact
that the monetary authorities will only abandon the simple rule in exceptional times.
Since employment persists, the central banker will react more, the more seldom it
will act discretionary in the future. This is in order to secure that employment is as
close to the goal as possible also in normal times. Hence, the monetary authorities
to react more the lower the probability that they will act in the near future, thus the
lower q is. The second factor is related to how the probability parameter q influences
expected inflation. An increase in the probability of exceptional times will reduce
the (absolute) value of expected inflation and make it possible for the authorities to
reach a certain level of employment by choosing a lower rate of inflation. This will
thus make the reaction lower the lower q is. The first factor will be more important
19Tobe precise c will only be a U-shaped function of q if there are sufficient employment persis-
tence for given levels of the other parameters. I will return to the reason for this below.
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Figure 3: The figure shows how employment persistence - in normal and exceptional
times - depends on q and "\.
if q is low; and the second when q is high. In addition, the first factor will be more
important the higher the employment persistence is.::W
Figure 3 shows how employment persistence depends on ,,\cb and q. The upper
part of the figure - values above p - shows employment persistence in normal times;
and it is seen that increases in the probability q increases the persistence. Since
a higher q implies that exceptional times will occur more often, expected inflation
will be higher for a given (negative) level of past employment. Therefore, when the
central bank sets inflation equal to zero in normal times, this represents a negative
inflation surprise and employment persistence will be higher than p. As noted above,
an escape-clause regime - if there is employment persistence - introduces a state-
dependent "Peso-problem". The different lines in figure 3 represent different sizes
of ,,\cb; and higher ,,\cb pushes the lines upwards in the diagram. Higher Nb thus
increases employment persistence in normal times and the reason is that expected
inflation will be higher (for a given negative value of employment). The lower part
20This explains why c is an U-shaped function only if there is sufficient persistence.
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of the figure - values below p - shows employment persistence in exceptional times;
and both q and A cb will now have opposite effects.
The question that remains to be answered is whether the escape-clause discussed
above helps resolve some of the credibility problems in monetary policy. To answer
this question, first note that the conservative central banker dominates both dis-
cretion and the simple rule. Rogoff (op.cit.) shows that in the one-period case it
is optimal to choose a weight on employment variations between zero and that of
society. If there is employment persistence, there will be no costs of lowering the
weight somewhat below that of society, since stabilization is biased. Furthermore,
at Aeb = O - where the conservative central banker mimics the simple rule - the
state-contingent bias has disappeared, but there is a stabilization bias. An increase
in A cb will therefore result in an increase of the state-contingent bias of second or-
der, while the stabilization bias will be reduced by first order. Therefore, delegating
monetary policy to a conservative central banker will improve welfare."
The next question then is whether the conservative central banker should be
dictated further; and the answer is yes. This is due to the fad that the optimal
conservative central banker gives the optimal trade off between stabilization and
the state-contingent bias. The costs of having such central banker will be higher
the higher the realization of the shock is. An escape clause will therefore make it
possible for the society to choose a less conservative central banker for the situations
when the shocks are large; and a more conservative central banker - someone who
puts zero weight on the employment goal - for the situations when the shocks are
small.
21This result is shown analytically by Lockwood et al. (1998). They also allow the central banker
to have a higher discount factor than the government, thus ffb > ;3. If persistence p is high enough
and the discount factor of the central banker is sufficiently higher than ;3, they show that society
may not wish to delegate. I only look at the case where ,Beb = B.
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5 Concluding remarks
This paper extends the discussion about the conduct of monetary policy in the case
of employment persistence. The institutional set-up discussed in the paper consists
of i) an independent conservative central banker and ii) an escape clause. In normal
times the central banker is forced to follow a simple rule of setting inflation equal
to zero, but the rule may be abandoned in the case where large shocks have hit the
economy. In this cases the central banker carries out monetary policy based on its
own preferences, without interference of the government.
It is shown how a simple escape clause works if there is employment persistence.
First, as in the case analyzed by Flood and Issard (1989), monetary policy in normal
times is reduced to setting inflation equal to the goal; and since expected inflation is
non-zero if employment is non-zero, this will represent an inflationary or disinflation-
ary surprise which will influence employment. It is worth noting that in the Flood
and Issard (1989)-model the inflationary surprise was due to the average inflation
bias, while with employment persistence it will (also) be due to the state-contingent
bias. Since expected inflation depends on past inflation so will the inflationary (or
disinflationary) surprise, which implies that employment persistence will increase.
In exceptional times monetary policy will be discretionary as in Flood and Issard
(1989), though it will be carried out by a conservative central banker. Since expected
inflation is lower than it is without the escape clause, monetary policy will be more
effectivewhen the rule is abandoned. The result of this is that less inflation surprise
is needed to achieve a certain level of employment stabilization. In exceptional
times employment persistence will then fall,since the monetary policy surprise will
be increasing in past employment.
In the literature escape clauses have been related to fixed exchange rate regimes,
where the government keeps a fixed exchange rate in normal times and realigns
in exceptional times. This introduces a peso-problem, as the economy will suffer
from negative inflation surprises in normal times. If employment persists, the peso
problem will be state-contingent, since expected inflation will be higher the lower
employment is.
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6 Appendix
To find /2 I insert for inflation and employment in normal and exceptional times -
equations (13), (15), (16) and (20) - into the Bellman equation (7) and collecting
terms. This gives:
(21)
and solution to this can be written as:
l
2 (p282a2 - 4p2,(pQ2q (l - q) - a2/3 (l - q))
x [l - p2,(3 - 2p2 ){lia2/3 + 8p2 ;..cbo;2/3q (l - q)
+o;2Adi (1- q) ± JA] . (22)
where
A (l - p2{3)2 - 4p2o;2/3Nb
+ [16p2 ACba2,8q (l - q) + 2p2 AClia28 (l - q)
+2a2 Aca (l - q) + a4 )..':b2 (l - q)2] , (23)
and the smaller solution is the relevant one. To see this, note that from equation (21)
. cb 21+n2>.cb+4o:2>.cbq(q_l). C
that /2 = OIf P = O, and that /2 = A P l+n2>.cb(1-q) If (3 = O. "onsidering
the limit of the two solutions for /2 as P ----7 Oand ,8 ----7 Ogives
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Therefore, the smaller root is the relevant one.22
A necessary condition for 12 to have real solutions is that A is non-negative. It
is clear from A that the term in the square brackets reaches its minimum at q = l
(with O :S q :S l). A sufficient condition for the existence of a solution is therefore
that
that is, the condition for the situation without escape clause will suffice.
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ESSAY 2:
The sources of German business cycles: how
important are permanent shocks?*
Abstract
In this paper I analyze the German business cycles by conducting a st.ruc-
tural VAR analysis using long-run restrictions. The results are that the dis-
turbances that drive unemployment and output in the long run also seem to
be important factors for the business cycles. However, the most important
factor for the development of the unemployment and. output gaps seems to be
disturbances that have permanent effects on the rate of unemployment; and
since this disturbance drives the output gap and the price level in the same
direction, the potential conflict of monetary policy might be less.
'Thanks to Torben Andersen, Jordi Cali. Jan Tore Klovland, Stefano Neri, Joachim Scheide,
and Erling Steigum for comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1 Introduction
This paper looks at the sources of variation of key macroeconomic variables in
Germany. The motivation to do so is the fact that the Bundesbank is often used as
an example of a so-called weight-conservative independent central bank. The origin
is the work of Rogoff (1985), who suggested to choose a central banker with a lower
weight on the output or unemployment goal than the society has. This reduces the
so-called inflationary bias, since the CB has less incentives to inflate. However, it
introduces a stabilization bias because the high weight on stable inflation will induce
the CB to react less to an unfavorable disturbance to output or unemployment.! The
importance of this trade-off between reducing the inflationary bias and increase in
output/unemployment variation depends on how important different shocks are for
the development of output and unemployment. The potential conflict will be higher
if these variables are mainly driven by the shocks that have opposite effects on
unemployment/output and prices. In the literature these shocks have been related
to supply side disturbances. This follows from a text-book AD-AS model: negative
lThe paper builds on the credibility literature after the seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott
(1977) later popularized by Barro and Gordon (1983a,b). The idea is that the authorities will have
incentives to reduce unemployment below the natural level due to market failures giving a too
high natural level. Rational agents will. however, know about these incentives of the authorities
and will expect a rate of inflation, so that the cost of reducing unemployment by surprise inflation
will be high enough to discourage the authorities to do so. This literature has been criticized by
several authors, e.g. Blinder (1997). who claim that there is no reason why an independent central
bank will have a different goal for unemployment (or output) than the natural level; and if this
is so, there is no time-inconsistency problem. It is interesting to note, however. that Blinder is
sympathetic to Rogoff's interpretation of an independent central bank: "Indeed, the noun 'central
banker' practically cries out for the adjective 'conservative'."
In a recent paper, Clarida et al. (1999) argue that there may be gains from following a rule
(rather than discretionary policy) even if the goal of the authorities is the natural level. The
reason is that inflation is a forward-looking variable; it depends on - amongst other things - the
conduct of monetary policy in the future. Therefore, if the authorities could - in a credible way
- commit themselves to react aggressivelyon future inflation, it would have to decrease activity
less today to bring inflation down. An independent weight-conservative central banker may be a
credible signal to fight inflation in the future.
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aggregate demand shocks (monetary or fiscal) lead to a decrease in GDP and prices,
while a negative aggregate supply shocks lead to a decrease in GDP and an increase
m pnces.
Svensson (2000) argues that. some supply shocks will increase the output potential
(as well as output), so that the output gap may - in fact - decrease following
a positive shock. Thus, following these shocks there will be no conflicts in the
traditional sense." The different types of shocks may, however, affect the output
gap and inflation differently over time. So even if the output gap and inflation move
in the same direction, a conflict of goals may arise.
In order to focus on the source of variation of different variables I conduct a
structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) analysis using long-run restrictions. SVAR
analysis has come to be a common tool in analyzing business cycles and has proven
to give information about the source of fluctuations of macroeconomic variables.
The strategy used in this paper to decompose the different shocks follows Shapiro
and Watson (1988) to some extent, and the identification is done using long-run
restrictions. This was first used by Blanchard and Quah (19~9) in their seminal
article on the sources of fluctuations in output and unemployment for the US. Long-
run restrictions are also utilized by Clarida and Gertler (1996) in their analysis about
the source of variations in the real exchange rate. FUrthermore, Gall (1992) uses a
combination of short-run and long-run in his analysis of the US business cycles.
The analysis is done using five variables: the rate of unemployment, the gross
domestic product, the real exchange rate, the consumer price index, and a measure
of the nominal money holdings in the economy (M3). The motivation for choosing
these variables is that they are normally considered important for the conduct of
monetary policy. I assume that these variables are driven by five structural distur-
2This follows if the goal of the monetary authorities should be to limit variations in output and
unemployment around their natural levels. In order to change the natural level of these variables
other policy measures have to be used, such as structural policy to reduce structural unemployment
or tax-policy to increase the well-functioning of the market economy. In this case, the motivation
of selecting an independent central bank also disappears. However, one might argue that these
supply shocks do not change the market inefficiencies. and therefore the government incentives to
use surprise inflation do not change.
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bances - four permanent and one transitory. The actual ordering is done as follows:
Permanent labour shocks are defined as the only disturbances that have a long-run
impact on the rate of unemployment. thus they change the natural rate of unemploy-
ment. Permanent output shocks do not have a long-run impact on unemployment,
but shifts the production frontier and will thus have a long-run impact on GDP.
Permanent real exchange rate shocks do not have a long-run impact on neither un-
employment nor on GDP, but may change composition of GDP via their long-run
impact. on the real exchange rate. Neither the permanent real money shocks nor
the transitory shocks have long-run impact on the unemployment and output. In
addition they do not change the real exchange rate in the long run. The transitory
shocks - in addition - are assumed not to have a long-run effect on real money hold-
ings. This set of restrictions then identifies the structural disturbances and reveal
how they affect the macroeconomic variables both contemporaneously and through
time.
This analysis will also enable me to look closer on some monetary policy issues.
More precise, by looking at the impulse responses following different shocks I try
to get "indirect" evidence of how monetary policy was conducted by the German
Bundesbank. In particular I ask how the Bundesbank seems to have reacted on the
permanent labour and output disturbances; and what seems to have been the target
for German monetary policy.
Since the first of January 1999 the European Central Bank (ECB) has been
responsible for conducting monetary policy in most of the countries in the European
Union. Germany participates in the monetary union and thus this event also ended
the era of the German Bundesbank as the responsible monetary policy institution.
Understanding how the Bundesbank conducted monetary policy may, however, still
give important insights about monetary policy issues. First, the Bundesbank is
well known for its inflation record, and thus understanding how this was achieved is
certainly an important task. Secondly, the ECB is said to be constructed as a mirror
image of the Bundesbank, thus insight about the Bundesbank may - as a by-product.
- give insights about the future operations of the ECE. If this is so, and since the
German economy is important for the development of Euroland - and thereby giving
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correlation between business cycles in Germany and Euroland, analyzing the sources
of business cycles development in Germany will also give insights about the possible
cost for Germany of having an independent - and conservative - European central
bank.
Funke (1997b) analyzes a bivariate SVAR with industrial production and pro-
ducer prices using a long-run Blanchard-Quah restriction. He finds that demand
shocks account for slightly less than 50 per cent of the contemporaneous variations
in industrial production; but the effect of the demand disturbances is short-lasting
and reaches zero already after three quarters. Therefore, supply shocks are seen
to be the most important factor also in the short run, pointing towards a poten-
tial monetary policy conflict between inflation and output. Bergman (1996) also
conducts a bivariate VAR but the analysis is done using German real GDP and
consumer price inflation. He reports that permanent output disturbances account
for around 20 per cent of the contemporaneous variation in output; and that this
fraction rises to more than 50 per cent after 20 quarters. These results also square
with Karras (1994), who uses unemployment and output and conducts a Blanchard
and Quah (1989) analysis.
Weber (1996) conducts a structural VAR analysis using SLX variables - changes in
employment, GDP, the real interest rate, the real wage, the real money holdings and
the nominal interest. rate. One important finding of his analysis is that aggregate
demand shocks seem to be the most important factor driving output in the short run;
thus indicat.ing that the costs of a conservative central banker will be limited. To
identify the shocks Weber uses a combination of short-run and long-run restrictions,
while Iexclusively look at long-run rest.rictions. This is an important difference, since
I also explicitly considers the real exchange rate. It might be questioned whether
restricting the monetary shocks not to influence output within the quarter -- which
is done by Weber (1996) - is correct if the exchange rate channel is important.
Clarida and Gertler (1996) rely on short-run restrictions in their analysis of
the German economy. Their aim is to describe how the Bundesbank conducted
monetary policy, however. and they do not focus on t he sources of variations in the
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macroeconomic variables." Funke (1997a) also relies on short-run restrictions in his
five-variable SVAR. He uses real GDP, the rate ofunemployment, the GDP deflator,
hourly earnings and M3 to conduct an analysis based on the work of Blanchard
(1989). He finds that demand shocks are the most important factor driving output
variations in the short run, while supply shocks are more important in the long run.
Supply shocks are the most. important factor driving variations in unemployment;
and demand shocks only play a minor role in the short run. Therefore, if the
cent.ral bank cares about. variations in the rate of unemployment, Funke's analysis
indicates that there might be trade-offs in monetary policy between unemployment
and inflation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The second part describes the
empirical procedure, and the third part the empirical results - how the different
variables react to different shocks and what are the sources of variation of t.he vari-
ables. The fourth part concludes.
2 Structural VAR analysis
2.1 Identification
The identificat.ion scheme used in this paper is an ext.ension of Shapiro and Wat-
son (1988). I consider a five-variable vector autoregressive (VAR) model for the
German economy. The variables are the rate of unemployment, the gross domestic
product (GDP), the real exchange rate (RER), the consumer price index (CPI),
and the monet.ary aggregate M3.4 The variables are denoted 'Ut, Yt, qt, Pt, and m-,
respectively, and all variables, except for the rate of unemployment, are in logs.
I assume that the five variables are driven by five serially and mutually indepen-
3To do the analysis they set up an eight variable VAR; and they are able to identify a money
demand and a money supply relationship. The latter is then used to analyze the behavior of the
German policy instrument, which is assumed to be the day-to-day interest rate.
4The data sources are as follows: for GDP, CPL the real exchange rate, and M3 - Statis-
tiche Bundesamt; the rate of unemployment - OECD before 1992:2 and Statistische Bundesbank
thereafter.
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dent so-called structural shocks: permanent labour shocks e~s. permanent output
shocks efs, permanent real exchange rate shocks e~s, permanent real money shocks
e~ms, and transitory shocks e~s. Letting X, = (.6.Ut, .6.Yt, .6.qt, .6.Pt, .6.mt)' be the vec-
tor of covariance stationary macroeconomic variables, and et = (eIS, ers, e~s, e~ms, ets) I
the vector containing the structural shocks. it is assumed that the macroeconomic
variables can be represented as:
X, = <P (L) et, (1)
where <P (L) = (<Pu (L), e, (L), <Pq (L) .e, (L), <Pm (L)) is a 5 x 1 polynomial matrix.
I follow the convention and assume that the structural shocks are orthogonal and
normalize their variance to unity. These assumptions therefore imply that Eee = 15•
where E is the expectation operator.
The reduced-form Wold-moving-average representation of equation (1) is given
by:
(2)
where et "" N (O,:E). Therefore, it is assumed that the reduced form innovations
and the structural shocks are related by et = Ce.,
x, =B (L) Cet, (3)
where C = <P (O) since B (O)= I, and the two polynomial matrixes are related by
<I> (j) = B (j) C for all j. The reduced form innovations are thus assumed to be
linear combinations of the structural shocks. This specification follows Amisano
and Giannini (1997), and the model is a so-called C-model after the matrix relating
the structural model to the VAR representation. I will estimate the inverted version
of this equation, thus
(4)
where A (L) = 1 - AIL - ... - ApLP. This gives estimates of the A (L) polynomial
matrix and the covariance matrix :E. Besides, since A (L) = B (Lr l, this also gives
estimates of the B (L) matrix.
51
To be able to identify the five types of structural disturbances I need 25 different
restrictions. I get 5 (5+ 1) /2 = 15 restrictions from normality and the orthogonal-
ity of the structural shocks: taking expectations on both sides of ete~= Cete~C'
gives CC' = :E, which is a symmetric matrix and thus contains 15 different ele-
ments. Therefore, I need 10 additional restrictions, which I get from the long-run
restrictions."
In this paper I limit the identification to recover the structural disturbances
et = Ce.; therefore I leave the structural equations unrestricted in the sense that I
do not recover how the different variables interact. A generalization of the C-model
in equation (3) is the AB-model given by
AA (L) x, = Bet,
where thus C = A ~lB give the simplified model used above. In addition to identi-
fying the shocks the structural relationships between the different variables are also
identified. To do this, additional 25 restrictions will have to be put on the system,
however. The advantage of the C-model is thus that "few" restrictions will have
to be specified; but the disadvantage is that the structural relationships are not
identified. This makes the analysis less appropriate for e.g. counterfactual analysis,
where tests on parameter stability amongst the structural parameters are important
in judging the validity.
The structure of the restrictions used in this paper may be written as
1 O O O O * O O O O
O 1 O O O * * O O O
O O 1 O O <1>(1)= * * * O O (5)
O O O -1 1 * * * * O
O O O O 1 * * * * *
where "*" denotes unrestricted elements. Unemployment is therefore driven by the
permanent labour shocks in the long run; while output is driven by both permanent
labour shocks and permanent output shocks. The idea is consequently that there
5For a critical discussion of the use of long-run restrictions see e.g. Canova et al. (1993).
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exist shocks that only affect output, without affecting the rate of unemployment.
Furthermore, there are shocks that do not affect neither unemployment nor output,
but they affect the real exchange rate. These are shocks that change the composition
of GDP, without affecting its level. The last long-run restriction relates to shocks
that may change the real money holdings in the long run, but do not change t.he
real exchange rate. This is the restriction used by Clarida and Gall (1994) in their
analysis of the sources of real exchange rate variations. They assume that neither
money demand nor money supply shocks affect the real exchange rate in the long
run. I have labeled this disturbance permanent real money shocks. The last. shock
- the transitory shock - is not allowed to affect any of the real variables in the long
run.
It might be questioned whether the chosen ordering is appropriate. Not at least
is the ordering of permanent real exchange rate and real money shocks to some
extent arbitrary. The actual ordering says that there might be disturbances that
changes the real money balances in the long run, but. not the real exchange rate.6
This paper is mostly concerned about shocks that affect unemployment or output
in the long run, however, and the identification of the permanent labour shocks and
the permanent output shocks does not depend on the ordering of the permanent
real exchange rate and real money shocks.
Notice that the C matrix might be recovered from the data using the Cholesky
decomposition. To see this, note that the right hand side of the equation (5) - from
now denoted P - is lower triangular. Therefore, it is the Cholesky decomposition
of the matrix F<I>(l) <I>(l)'F' = FB(l)CC'B(l)'F', where F is the first matrix
on the left hand side of equation (5). Here the C matrix enters, though, which is
unobserved, but knowing that CC' = :E the relationship may be written as
pp' = FB (l):EB (1)' F'. (6)
The contemporaneous relationships - the C matrix - may therefore be found by
6For instance, if money is neutral in the long run, change; in the demand for money will fall
into this category. See e.g. Weber (1994) for a discussion about long-run neutrality.
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using
c = (FB (1)r1 P,
which follows from equation (5) above.
2.2 Unit-root test and lag structure
In the outline of the structural VAR model above I have assumed that l:!.Ut, l:!.Yt,
l:!.qt, l:!.Pt, and l:!.mt are stationary time series. Here these assumptions are tested
using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests, Phillips-Perron (PP) tests, and the
Kwiatowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test, thus I look at the unit-root proper-
ties for the five series. The former two groups of tests use non-stationarity as the
nil hypothesis, while the latter test uses stationarity. The lag length is calculated
using the LB-test and the LM-test for autocorrelation. The results are reported in
table 1.
The rate of unemployment seem to be integrated: neither the ADF-tests nor
the PP-tests can reject the HOof non-stationarity against stationarity - or trend-
stationarity - at any level of significance (up to the 10 per cent level) and the
KPSS-test can reject stationarity at the one per cent level of significance." The
tests on the first difference of the rate of unemployment can reject non-stationarity
(at least at the five per cent level), and the HOof the stationarity test cannot be
rejected at the 2.5 per cent level. Thus, unemployment seems to be 1(1)and its first
difference 1(0). The same results are found for output and nominal money holdings.
For the former trend-stationarity can be rejected at the 2.5 per cent level (and none
of the non-stationarity tests can be rejected); and the non-stationarity test for the
first difference of output can be rejected at the one per cent level for all tests. For
the latter trend-stationarity can be rejected at the five per cent level and three of
the non-stationarity test do not reject the nil hypothesis (the ADF Z-test reject
non-stationarity against trend-stationarity at the 10 per cent level, though): and
both the non-stationarity tests are rejected at the one per cent level for the first
7Trend-stationarity is rejected at 2..'')level of significance.
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difference. Therefore, both output and nominal money seem to be 1(1) with a trend
and the first difference hence 1(0).
Unfortunately, however, the tests give somewhat unclear results regarding two of
the time-series, namely for the real exchange rate and the price level. For the first
difference of the real exchange rate the tests uniformly reject non-stationarity at the
one per cent level, and stationarity cannot be rejecteel at any level of significance.
This indicates that the first difference is indeed 1(0). However, the tests are unclear
regarding the level of the variable. First, stationarity and trend-stationarity can be
rejected at the ten and one per cent level of significance, respectively. Secondly, the
ADF-tests reject non-stationarity at the one per cent level of significance for the
t-test (also when a trend is included) and at the 2.5 per cent level for the Z-test
(and at the ten per cent level when a trend is included). The PP-tests, however,
fail to reject non-stationarity, except for the t-test without a trend, where unit-root
may be rejected at the 10 per cent level. Despite of the unclear results, I will keep
the initial assumptions and treat the real exchange rate as a non-stationary time
series, and its first difference as stationary.
For the price level the tests suggest that the series are at least 1(1) with a trend
since none of the non-stationarity tests can be rejected at any level of significance
and the trend-stationary test can be rejecteel at the five per cent level. The test
on the first difference of the series give less clear results. though. Both PP-tests
reject the non-stationarity at the one per cent level, but only the ADF Z-test rejects
non-stationarity - and only at the 10 per cent level. Moreover, stationarity is - in
fact - rejected at the five per cent level of significance. However, considering the
unit-root property of nominal money, it seems natural to assume that the price level
is also 1(1) with trend and that its first difference is stationary.
All in all the tests suggest the following unit-root property for the series:
'11-+1(1), ~'U-+1(0)
y -+ 1 (1) + trend, ~y -+ 1 (O)
q -+ 1 (1) + trend, ~q -+ 1 (O)
p -+ 1 (1) + trend, ~p -+ 1 (O)
m -+ 1 (1) + trend, ~m -+ 1 (O) .
(7)
Table 1: Unit-root properties of the time-series
Test stat.ist.ic!
x # lags DC2 t-t.est Z-test KPSS
LB/LM ADF/PP AD/PP
u 3/1 C -2.3479/-1.2389 -6.1693/-2.0414 1.3317iv
T -2.7289/-1.6225 -13.8966/-4.7205 0.2118iii
~'U 2/0 C -3.041Oiv / -3.6481 il' -25.419il' /-24.8196iv 0.1885
y 4/1 T -2.0527/-2.1712 -7.3715/-6.3685 0.1905iii
~y 3/0 C -3.8960ir / -8.0839iv -49.0059il' /-81.8087iV 0.2403
q 2/1 C -3.8066iV/ -2.6538i -19.3614iii /-9.5808 0.3547i
T -4.2130il' /-2.7499 -19.6443i /-9.6968 0.3155iv
~q 1/0 C -4.4038il' / -5.8854il' -38.3595il' /-47.8120iv 0.2486
P 3/1 T -2.4990/-2.1964 -12.3932/-5.8930 0.1604ii
~p 2/0 C -2.5044/-4.9705iv -12.6130i / -34.6408iv 0.4769ii
T -2.54965/ -5.17750iv -13.65403/ -38.53750iv 0.2674iv
m 1/1 T -2.9631/ -2.7131 -17.9804i /-14.1275 0.1714ii
~m O/O C -7.2455il' -62.1073iv 0.0593
lThe superscript i.ii, iii. and iv indicate that the test statistic is significant at the 10, 5, 2.5
and 1 per cent level. If the test includes a constant, the critical values are -2.58, -2.89, -3.1i and
-3.51 for the t-tests: and -11.0, -13.i, -16.3, and -19.8 for the Z-tests. If the test includes both a
constant and a trend, they are -3.1.5. -3.45. -3.i3 and -4.04 for the t-tests; and -li.5. -20.i, -23.6,
and -2i.4 for the Z-test. The critical values for the KPSS-test are 0.34i, 0.463, D..5i4, and D.i39
for stationarity and 0.119, 0.146, 0.1i6, and 0.216 for trend-stationarity.
2This column indicates which deterministic variables are included in the regression. "G' de-
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notes a constant and "T" a trend, and the latter include both a deterministic constant and a
trend.
Before testing for the appropriate lag length, a ratio test was used to test whether
or not to include a dummy for the German reunification, i.e. a dummy for the first.
quarter of 1991. The test rejected the exclusion of this dummy at the five per cent
level of significance using different lag lengths." The lag length for the reduced form
VAR was then calculated using a ratio tests paring down the lag length starting
with eight lags (see e.g. Enders 1995: 312-314). These tests indicate the use of four
lags."
3 The sources of German business cycles
3.1 Impulse response functions
The impulse response functions show the impact on variable Xi in period t + s from
a one-unit increase in shock ej in period t, Since the shocks are orthogonal by con-
struction, this gives information about how the four variables react over time to the
different disturbances. Figure (1) and (2) show the impulse response functions of
a one-standard deviation shock for unemployment, output, the real exchange rate,
prices, and nominal and real money balances following (permanent) labour, (perma-
nent) output, (permanent) real exchange rate, (permanent) real money (RM), and
transitory shocks. The figures also include a 10 % confidence bands: so with 90 %
probability, the shocks will have effects that fall within the bands.
A positive labour shock decreases the rate of unemployment and increases output.
Since a natural interpretation of labour shocks are disturbances that ~ all other
things equal ~ decrease labour costs, the effects are therefore as expected. A decrease
in the wage demand from labour unions decreases unemployment and increases
sThe levels of significanse were 0.00499880, 0.00000001, 0.00000001, 0.00000002, and
0.00000000, for the tests using 2, .. ,6 lags, respectively,
9The significance levels were 0.76668105, 0.41086i36, 0.16099151, 0.52192216. and 0.00025340
for the test of seven versus eight lags, six versus seven, etc.
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Figure 1: Permanent labour and output shocks.
output by shifting the technology frontier. Notice that unemployment decreases
steadily after the initial effect and settles on a higher level after some 16 quarters.
Output, however, hardly reacts the first 4-6 quarters after the initial disturbance.
Eventually, though, output starts increasing and settles on a higher level after about
20 quarters. As a result, the response of output seem to have a one-year long delay
compared to that of the rate of unemployment. One possible explanation to this
finding is a simple Keynesian demand story. An exogenous increase in wage demand
from labour unions - i.e. a negative labour shock - will have two effects on output. lO
First, there is the direct effect of increased costs of production which should decrease
10This effect will, however, be reduced to some degree due to open-economy effects: there will be a
real apreciation, which will increase exports and shift demand from imported towards domestically
produced goods.
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output. Secondly, there is the indirect effect of increased demand due to higher real
wages. A possible explanation of the delayed effect is consequently that, in the
short run, the indirect effect more or less cancels out the direct effect. Eventually
increased demand feeds into higher prices and output starts to fall. Unemployment
increases also in the short run, though, due to subst.itution in production away from
labour.
The real exchange rate increases following a positive labour shock, while the
price level decreases. The increase in domestic production reduces the demand for
foreign currency - therefore the nominal exchange rate increases. Furthermore, the
domestic price level falls, which also will increase the real exchange rate. Some of
the effect on the price level is, however, reversed. This would be the case with slow
adjustment of nominal wages and mark-up pricing: when wages start to grow due
to low unemployment, prices will then increase. This may then also explain the
overshooting of the real exchange rate. Since the price level decreases following a
labour market shock, this means that this shock has opposite effects on output and
prices. For that reason, there exists a possible trade-off of monetary policy following
such shocks: the interest rate should be reduced in order to increase output and
decrease unemployment, while it should be raised to decrease inflation.
As far as the effect on the monetary aggregates are concerned, the nominal money
holdings hardly change, while the real money holdings increase due to the fall in the
price level. The former may be seen as an indication that the Bundesbank has not
reacted to labour market shocks: it has accommodated the changes in the different
variables following this shock.
The permanent output shocks - which increase output - decrease unemployment
temporarily. Furthermore, prices seem to increase. The effect on the real exchange
rate is small and not significantly different from zero shortly after the disturbance
occurred.
One possible explanation for the sign of the effect on prices is that the identi-
fication picks up fiscal shocks with small permanent effects. Changes in aggregate
demand would then have effects both on prices and output in the short run, while
most of the effect would translate into higher prices in the long run. This could also
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Figure 2: Permanent real exchange rate shocks; permanent real money shocks; and
transitory shocks.
explain the hump-shaped impulse response of output, since most of the effect of a
aggregate demand shock dies out.
As far as the effect on nominal and real money holdings are concerned, the former
hardly change and the latter fall due to the increase in prices. Thus the Bundesbank
does not seem to have reacted to permanent output shocks either.
Permanent real exchange rate shocks lead to a temporary decrease in the rate
of unemployment and a temporary increase in output. Besides, there is an increase
in prices - even though the initial effect is negative - and the real exchange rate
decreases. Except from the initial effect on the price level, the effects are then in
accordance to a standard text-book macro model: the shocks move the investment-
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supply curve. If this is so, the effects on the nominal and real money holdings are
counter intuitive. The reason is that they both seem to decrease, while a IS-LM
model predicts that money holdings would increase if the nominal interest rate is
held unchanged. One possible explanation is that the Bundesbank has reacted to
expansionary fiscal policy (or changes in demand due to changes in consumer pref-
erences) by contractionary monetary policy. This may thus give support to claims
of some politicians that the Bundesbank has counteracted the fiscal authorities by
their concern about inflation.
Turning to the effects of permanent real money shocks, the rate of unemployment
decreases and output increases followinga shock that decreases the real money shock.
This seems reasonable since, for a given level of the nominal interest rate, output
must increase to ensure equilibrium in the money market. In addition, the price
level increases and the nominal money holdings decrease. These shock therefore
drive output and prices in the same direction: output increases temporarily due to
some stickiness, but over time the price level rises more and more and the effect on
output (and unemployment) dies. However, both the effect on unemployment and
output is quite persistent, lasting about 26 quarters.
The effects on the real exchange rate are unclear. Initially the effect is negative,
then the impact is reversed in the second quarter and stays positive until the sixth
quarter. The effect is small, however, and not significantly different from zero at the
ten per cent level of significance already after four quarters.
Looking at the effect on the nominal money holdings, this may be an indication
that the Bundesbank has tried to meet a decrease in the demand for real money
by reducing the supply of nominal money. However, since the Bundesbank can not
control the M3 money measure perfectly, the change in nominal money may also
be a change in the creation of money in the banking system. The shape of the
impulse response does indicate some action of the Bundesbank, though, namely a
temporary contractionary policy. In this way the large effect in the second quarter
may be explained and also the fact that some of the effects are reversed before it
settles in the eighth quarter.
The transitory shock increases output and prices, while unemployment IS de-
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creased. Consequently, there are no inflation-output trade-off followingthese distur-
bances. However, both the impact on unemployment and output are quite persistent,
lasting about 30 quarters, that is between seven and eight years. It is furthermore
worth noting that while the largest impact on unemployment occurs some 7 quarters
after the shock, the impact on output has a longer delay reaching the peak in the
14th quarter. Furthermore, the impact on output - especially the first four quarters
- is quite modest and except from the initial effect, the 10 per cent band does in
fact include zero in all periods.
A positive transitory shock leads to a temporary fall in the real exchange rate,
that is to say to a real appreciation. As far as the effect on nominal and real
money balances are concerned, a positive transitory shock increases nominal money
balances and due to some price stickiness also real money holdings increase tem-
porarily. Over time, the increase in the supply of money is met one-to-one by an
increase in the price level, leaving the real money holdings unchanged in the long
run.
Before looking closer at the source of variation of the variables, I take a brief
look at the unemployment and output gap. The motivation for doing this is the as-
sumption that the monetary authorities should stabilize unemployment and output
around their natural level. This is based on the assumption of monetary long-run
neutrality: and thus changing the natural level of output or unemployment should
not be the object of monetary policy. Using the output gap as the aim for monetary
policy, Svensson (2000) noted that there is not necessarily a trade-off between infla-
tion and output even followinga supply shock. The reason is that permanent supply
shocks may increase both output and the output potential; and thus the output gap
may in fact decrease. This will be so if rigidities on the demand side restrict the
economy from fully taking advantage of the increase in capacity.
The gaps are defined as the difference between the permanent effect of a distur-
bance and the impulse response, thus as
(8)
For the disturbances that do not have long-run impact on unemployment or output,
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Figure 3: Unemployment and Output Gaps
the gap will thus simply be the impulse response.
As far as the source of changes in the unemployment is concerned, labour shocks
stood out; and this is also so for the unemployment gap. The disturbance drive -
by definition - long-run unemployment, but due to the long adjustment period it
also seem to be the most important shock describing the unemployment gap.
The two important disturbances describing development of output were the per-
manent labour and output shocks; but for the output gap, labour shocks are by far
the most important. Hence, labour shocks induce a long adjustment period in output
as well, and for this reason, there are no traditional inflation-output junemployment
trade-offs following this disturbance. A negative labour shock decreases the unem-
ployment gap, it increases the output gap, and it increases prices; and the appro-
priate monetary policy would be a contractionary in order to decrease output and
increase unemployment further. As noted above, it seems to be the case that the
monetary authorities have accommodated both shocks that have permanent impact
on output. This may seem unnecessary, since the permanent labour shocks do not
appear to give any inflation-output/unemployment trade-off. However, this disre-
gards the political difficulties - even for an independent central bank - in reducing
unemployment further by contractionary monetary policy arguing that unemploy-
ment is above the natural level.
As far as the permanent output shocks are concerned, there is also no traditional
output/inflation trade-off. A positive output shock increases unemployment tem-
porarily, though, so if the authorities do care about unemployment variations, there
will be a trade-off.
Before turning to variance decomposition, I also look at the rate of inflation.
This is done since inflation ~-and not the price level - has been the objective for
the German monetary policy.l l The distinction between inflation and price level
targeting is, however, beyond the aim of this paper.l?
Figure (4) shows the impulse response functions for the rate of inflation following
the five structural disturbances. The rate of inflation seems to be driven by all of
the five shocks, even though the least important shock appears to be the permanent
output disturbance. Besides, most of the disturbances seem to bring about con-
siderable variations in the inflation rate in addition to the temporary effect on the
level.
3.2 The sources of variation: FEVD analysis
Further information about the sources of variation of the variables can be found by
doing a so called forward error variance decomposition. This tells how much of the
variation of the variables are due to the different shocks. The mean squared error
11In fact pr-ice-stab'ility has been the aim of monetary policy, but price stability has been asso-
ciated with a positive rate of inflation; and no attempts have been made to bring the price level
back to the trend-growth if the inflation target has not been met,
l:2Pora theoretical consideration see e.g. Svensson (1999).
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Figure 4: Impulse responces for the rate of inflation
of a s-periods forecast of the variable z -- i.e. 'U, y, q, p, and m - can be written as
(see e.g, Hamilton 1994: 323-324)13:
(9)
where ej, for j = 1, .., 5, denote the five shocks. The term Zt+s - Zt+slt gives the
error in forecasting the value of Z in period t + s, given the information in period t.
Consequently, equation (9) gives the variance of the forecasted error. The proportion
13The formula takes into account that Eee = Is, and as a result the variance term in equation
[11.5.6] in Hamilton (1994) disappears.
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due to shock ej will hence be given by:
(~)2 + (azt;I)2 + ...+ (a~t+s)2
(Jet aCt acJ (10)
Af SE (Zt+slt)
Figure (5) plots the variance decomposition for the six variables, while the tables
2 to 4 give more specific information about the variance decomposition at certain
points in time. The variance decomposition of real money is calculated from the
impulse responses of nominal money and prices. Several features stand out.
The permanent labour and output disturbances are important both for unem-
ployment and output, also in the short run. The two shocks account for from 32
to 55 per cent of the changes in unemployment even in the short run, with most
of the changes being generated by labour shocks (about 30 and 50 per cent in the
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first and fourth quarter, respectively). Afterwards this percentage rises steadily: in
the eighth quarter to about 70 per cent; in the 12th quarter to about 80 per cent;
and finally in the 32nd quarter to about 95 per cent. Furthermore, the permanent
output shock explains about 9 per cent in the eighth quarter, and thereafter its
influence gradually diminishes. As far as the permanent real money shocks and
the transitory shocks are concerned, they both have important short-run impacts,
while the permanent real exchange rate shock only have a minor influence. Most
remarkable is the effect of the real money shock, which explain between 30 and 50
per cent of the variation of rate of unemployment in the first four quarters. This
is especially interesting in Germany due to the announced money targeting. The
reason is that this shock changes long-run real money holdings; and since it has no
impact on unemployment, outpur or the real exchange rate, it is natural to link the
disturbance to the demand for real money balances. I will return to this below.
The permanent labour and output shocks explain even a larger part of a forecast
in output, where they explain more than 70 per cent over all horizons. In the short
run, permanent labour shocks are most important, while labour shocks are more
important in the longer run. More precise, the output shocks explain between 68
(contemporaneously) and 75 per cent of the variation up to the eighth quarter; but.
thereafter its importance gradually diminishes. In an eight-quarter forecast, labour
shocks account for about 10 per cent of the variance; and this percentage grows
steadily to about 25 per cent in the 12th quarter, to close to 50 per cent in the 20th
quarter and finally to above 60 per cent in the 32nd quarter.
Except from labour and output shocks, the most important factors are the real
exchange rate and the real money shocks. The former accounts for between five
and 10 per cent the first four quarters; but thereafter its importance vanishes. The
latter explains close to 20 per cent of the variation of output contemporarily, about
10 per cent in the fourth quarter and thereafter its influence continues to decrease.
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Table 2: FEVD of unemployment and output
Unemployment Output
Qrt LS OS QS RMS TS LS OS QS RMS TS
1 30.5 1.8 0.0 49.6 18.1 7.1 68.6 5.1 19.2 0.0
2 38.4 0.6 1.8 46.2 13.0 8.8 68.0 6.9 16.2 0.1
4 51.7 3.2 2.3 34.3 8.5 4.3 74.5 10.3 10.8 0.1
8 63.9 8.8 3.2 17.8 6.3 10.1 73.7 8.6 6.7 0.9
12 76.3 6.8 1.9 10.3 4.7 26.0 62.5 4.7 5.8 1.0
20 88.8 3.G 0.7 4.5 2.4 47.8 46.1 2.1 3.0 1.0
32 94.4 1.8 0.4 2.2 1.2 62.6 34.1 1.1 1.6 0.6
00 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 78.0 22.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
The real exchange rate is mostly driven by the permanent REER shock; and
actually this disturbance accounts for more than two thirds of variations over all
horizons. Except from this, both the temporary labour shock and the transitory
shock have some influence on REER variability. The former explains some three per
cent contemporaneously, and thereafter its influence rises to more than one fourth
in the eighth quarter, before it reduces and settles around 20 per cent in the long
run; the latter explains more than 20 per cent contemporaneously, but this fraction
quickly vanishes through time. As far as the permanent output and real money
shocks are concerned. neither of them have important effects on the real exchange
rate.
The permanent labour shocks are the most important disturbance driving con-
sumer prices in the short to medium run. In fact these shocks explain as much as
between 50 and 75 per cent of variation of consumer prices up to the 32nd quarter
(and it approaches about one third in the long run). Furthermore, both the per-
manent real money shock and the transitory shock have important impacts on the
development of consumer prices. The former accounts for about one fourth of con-
temporaneous variation in consumer prices; in the medium term this fraction drops
down to about 10 per cent in the eighth quarter; thereafter it increases to close to
20 per cent in the long run. The latter accounts for close to 15 per cent of the
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variation of prices contemporaneously, and this fraction steadily increases through
time approaching close to one third in the long run.
Table 3: FEVD of REER and CPI
REER CPI
Qrt LS OS QS RMS TS LS OS QS RMS TS
1 3.0 0.5 74.0 1.3 21.2 56.2 0.7 5.9 23.2 13.9
2 12A 0.2 74.0 0.5 12.9 60.1 0.3 2.2 21.3 16.1
4 22.3 0.2 69.6 1.1 6.8 68.8 0.5 1.1 11.3 18.3
8 27.5 0.1 68.9 0.6 2.9 72.2 0.6 1.2 10.5 15.5
12 26.0 0.6 71.0 0.6 1.8 68.7 2.1 1.5 12.6 15.1
20 124.8 0.8 73.0 DA 1.0 60.0 5.7 1.7 15A 17.2
32 23.1 0.8 75.2 0.2 0.7 49.7 9.3 1.4 18.3 21.3
00 21.2 0.6 78.2 0.0 0.0 32.1 14.0 0.7 22.8 30.4
The most important factor driving nominal money holdings are the transitory
disturbances. More than 50 per cent of contemporaneous variation in nominal money
is caused by these shocks. The fraction drops to one fourth in the fourth quarter,
but thereafter it rises again approaching more than 50 per cent in the long run.
Except from the transitory shocks, both the permanent real exchange rate and the
real money shocks have important effects on variations in nominal money. The
former accounts for between 40 (contemporaneously) and 65 (fourth quarter) per
cent in the very short run; but over time the influence drops towards one tenth in
the long run. The latter shock only has a minor short-run influence - between 3
and 10 per cent the first four quarters, but already in the eighth quarter close to
20 per cent of the variation is due to fiscal disturbances. Thereafter the influence
increases, approaching one third in the long run. Finally, neither of the shocks that
have long-run effects on output have important influence on variation in nominal
money.
Contemporaneously, about 20 per cent of the variation in the real money holdings
are caused by transitory disturbances. This fraction quickly diminishes, though,
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and already in the fourth quarter less than five per cent is due to changes in money
supply. In the short run, labour and the real money shocks are the most important
disturbances - in addition to the transitory shock. The former accounts for between
18 and 27 per cent of the variation in real money holdings the first two years; and the
latter accounts for more than 50 per cent - reaching a peak of close to 75 per cent
in the fourth quarter. In the medium to long run the importance of money demand
shocks decreases slightly - accounting for around 40 per cent in the long run, and
the influence of labour shocks increases to around 35 per cent. Furthermore, the
permanent real exchange rate shocks playa more important role in the long run,
accounting for about 20 per cent of the variation.
Table 4: FEVD of real and nominal money
M3 M3/P
Qrt LS OS QS RMS TS LS OS QS RMS TS
1 0.7 0.9 3.5 40.5 54A 18.9 1.5 0.2 59.8 19.6
2 0.6 DA 6.3 58A 34.3 14.8 0.6 3.9 72.1 8.6
4 2.5 0.5 9.0 G3.7 24.3 13.9 1.0 7A 73.3 4A
8 3A 1.5 22.6 45.8 2G.7 25.G 2.2 18.2 52.0 2.0
12 2A 1.3 27.9 34A 34.0 37.1 1.7 19.9 40.0 1.3
20 1.6 1.1 29.0 25.3 43.0 39.7 3.1 19.5 37.0 0.7
32 1.7 lA 29.7 19.0 48.2 39.1 4A 19.0 37.1 DA
00 3A 0.9 32.0 12.2 51.5 35.3 6A 19.1 39.2 0.0
Both Weber (199G) and Funke (1997a) use different time series in their analyses,
so it is difficult to make direct comparisons with their work. Some similarities and
differences are worth noting, however. First, both analysis point towards labour
shocks being the most important factor driving hours worked or unemployment:
both report that labour shocks account for close to or more than 80 per cent of the
variation in hours worked or unemployment. To some extent, this is confirmed in
my analysis, even though permanent real money shocks seem to be important in the
short run. As far as output is concerned, the two analysis diverge. Weber reports
that aggregate supply shocks explain close to 20 per cent of the contemporaneous
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variations in output, but this fraction quickly rises, and reaches 80 per cent already
in the fourth quarter. My result - namely that permanent shocks are important also
for the business cycle - is thus in line with his findings. Funke reports, however, that
demand disturbances account for as much as 80 per cent in the eighth quarter and
still60 per cent in the 24th quarter. As far as the development of consumer prices are
concerned, Funke finds that these are driven by so-called price-disturbances in the
short run (explaining as much as 96 per cent contemporaneously), while aggregate
demand shocks are the most important factor in the long run (86 per cent. after 24
quarters). Furthermore, the former disturbance does not seem to have a significant
effect on the other variables. Weber does not report variance decomposition of
the price level, but only looks at the rate of inflation. This points towards labour
demand and labour supply shocks as the most important disturbances, where the
former is the most important. Consequently, my analysis confirms Weber's results
to a certain amount. Last, Weber reports that variations in real money balances
mostly are due to disturbances that have permanent effects on output but not on
hours worked. My analysis also points towards the labour shocks, but the most
important factor is the real money disturbance.l" Furthermore, following Weber,
less of the variations in real money balances are due to money supply shocks than in
my analysis.l'' Funke does not report variance decomposition for real money, but his
results for the price level and nominal money point towards price-setting and money
disturbances, where the latter includes both money supply and demand shocks.l"
3.3 Money or inflation targeting
One of the cornerstones of the official German monetary policy was money target-
ing. This official stand has been questioned by a number of researchers, however.
14The real money disturbance in this paper is comparable to the money demand shock in \Veber.
Therefore, it is worth noting that the demand shock explains up to 24 per cent of the variations
in real money in Weber's analysis.
15The money supply shocks are comparable to the transitory shocks in my analysis.
16Aggregate demand shocks also play an important role both for the price level and for nominal
money; but a visual examination of the impulse responses suggests that the effects on real money
are limited.
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Bernanke and Mihov (1997) test whether forecasts of inflation and money growth
Granger-cause the Bundesbank instrument - which is assumed to be the Lombard
rate!". The idea behind the test is as follows: If the Bundesbank was a money
targeter, it should have reacted to expected changes in the growth rate of money
even if the excepted inflation is on the target. If this was not so, it can be taken
as an evidence that the Bundesbank was an inflation targeter rather than a money
targeter. The results are that both the forecasted rate of inflation and the forecasted
rate of money growth Granger-cause the Lombard rate significantly at the five per
cent level. However, looking at the decomposition of the forecast variance for the
instrument reveals that innovations in expected money growth only play a minor
role in explaining the Lombard rate. In the short run, the most important factor
for the forecast error of the instrument is its own shocks, pointing at some degree of
interest rate smoothing. In the longer run, the most important factor is the rate of
inflation, whereas money growth does not play an important role at any horizons.
This evidence then led the authors to conclude that "although the Bundesbank uses
money gro",ih as an important informat.ional variable and operating guide, and de-
spite its protestations to the contrary, it seems to be better characterized as an
inflation targeter than as a money targeter." 18
Clarida et al. (1998) estimate a policy reaction function for the central bank
of a number of different countries, amongst other for Germany. They use a GMM
procedure to construct a forward looking policy rule. Their baseline model includes
expected inflation and expected output gap, and a term picking up interest rate
smoothing. This model seems to describe the behavior of the nominal interest rate
rather well; the point estimates are reasonable - have the right sign and magnitude.
To the model the authors also add other variables which may enter the policy rule,
and specifically they add the gap between the money target and the actual money
17The test is also carried out using the call rate; and a spliced series using the Lombard rate
before 1985 and the call rate from 198.') and onwards. These tests give more or less the same results
as the base case using the Lombard rate.
18This result has been questioned by Briiggermann (1999). She argues that the results in
Bernanke and Mihov (1997) are due to the fact that the authors do not consider the asymmetric
reactions to positive and negative target deviation.
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stock. From this exercise they are able to conclude that their "baseline interest rate
reaction function clearly wins. The money aggregat.ejust does not matter, while the
other parameter estimates are largely unchanged."
Testing statistically for money versus inflation targeting goes beyond the aim of
this paper; and the impulse functions following the real money shocks give mixed
results. First, it seems to be the case that a fall in the demand for money has
led the Bundebank to reduce money supply even in the short run. This would ~
to some extent ~ point towards inflation targeting.19 However, the fact that the
real money shock seems to have important effects on real variables - and that the
effects are long-lasting ~ would point towards monetary targeting. Certainly, even
when targeting inflation, money demand changes may spread into the rest of the
economy, due to the fact that neither the interbank rate Fibor nor the money stock
M3 is perfectly controlled by the central bank. However, the real money shock have
long-lasting effects on other variables.
In any case, a necessary condition for money targeting to be successful is that
there is a close link between the rate of growth in the monetary aggregate and
the rate of inflation. This means that the money demand is stable. If this is so the
monetary target will act as an intermediate target; and by smoothing changes in the
intermediate target, the final target - the rate of inflation ~ is also smoothed. The
fact that. the permanent real money shocks seems so important for the development
of the real money balances may be taken as an evidence that the money demand
function is not stationary ~ or trend-stationary: and stationarity is important for
the success of monetary targeting.20
19The monetary target is set according to a long-run quantity-theory-of-money relationship:
where Sm: is the targeted change in the monetary aggregate; Lly' is the changes in potential
output; Jr' is the inflation target; and Llu' is the changes in equilibrium or long-run velocity of
money.
2oCabos et al. (1999) analyze the choice of monetary policy target using the Kalman filter for
German data from Bretton Woods until 199i. They find that control problems are likely to be
larger for intermediate broad money targets than for direct inflation targets. Moreover, they
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4 Concluding remarks
In this paper I have used a structural VAR analysis in order to decompose the
German business cycles into different components; and the aim has been to see
how important permanent shocks are for the business cycles. The main result is
that the most important factor for the development of unemployment seems to be
the permanent labour shock, even though real money shocks also seem to play a
significant role. The permanent shocks are also important for real GDP; and in this
case the shocks that have transitory effects accounts for less than one fourth in the
short run.
In addition to examine the different variables, I have also looked at the devel-
opment of the unemployment and output gaps followingthe different shocks. The
main finding is that labour shocks - which are disturbances that change the long-
run natural rate of unemployment - are the most important disturbance for the
variation in both the unemployment and the output gap. This is interesting, since a
positive labour shock decreases the unemployment gap and increases the output gap
and the price leveL As a result, the potential conflict of monetary policy should be
lower. However, there are certainly political difficulties - even for an independent
central bank - in carrying out contractionary monetary policy followinga negative
labour supply shock, even though it can be argued that the rate of unemployment is
higher than the natural level, And it seems that the Bundesbank has accommodated
these disturbances. As far as the future operation of the European Central Bank
is concerned, it is thus important that the central bank has enough independence.
Otherwise, German politicians might be tempted to pressure the central bank to
ease monetary policy when the economy is hit by shocks that permanent.ly increase
the natural rate of unemployment.
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ESSAY 3:
Tayloring the Norwegian interest rates"
Abstract
This paper looks at the celebrated Taylor rule for the Norwegian economy.
This rule is often used as an indication of what the interest rate would have
been if the Norwegian Central Bank had aimed at stabilizing the rate of
inflation through inflation targeting. However, in the theoreticalliterature on
inflation targeting it is often argued that the central bank should focus on
expected inflation. This is the motivation to compare the Taylor rule with a
forward-looking rule.
The main conclusion of the paper is that the two rules have a rather
similar development through time, and that they both have a significantly
different development than the actual short-term interest rate. Furthermore,
it seems that - to some extent - the Taylor rule and the foward-looking rule
are different over the economic cycles.
"Thanks to Torben Andersen, Jan Tore Klovland, and Erling Steigum for comments and sug-
gestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1 Introduction
In this paper I consider the celebrated Taylor (1993) rule for Norway. The moti-
vation is that the rule may be seen as an indication of how the Norwegian central
bank would have conducted monetary policy if they had followed an independent
monetary policy targeting domestic inflation. Taylor finds that his rule does a good
job tracking the actual US short term interest rate. As a matter of fact, except
from the period around the crack on the stock exchange in 1987, which required
extraordinary actions from the Federal Reserve, the difference between the hypo-
thetical interest rate and the actual one is remarkably small. The Taylor rate is also
interesting from a theoretical point of view, and in the second section I therefore
consider a theoretical model analyzing the targeting of expected inflation developed
by Svensson (1997). There he shows that the Taylor rule might in fact serve as an
instrument for targeting expected inflation if lagged output gap and inflation serve
to predict future inflation. However, Clarida and Gertler (1996) find that monetary
policy strategy of the German Bundesbank corresponds well to a forward-looking
rule; and better than to the Taylor rule. A similar result is reported by Clarida,
Gall and Gertler (1998) for the G3-countries - the US, Germany, and Japan. The
first study uses a combination of short-run and long-run restrictions to estimate
a structural VAR including amongst others an equation describing the monetary
policy rule. The second studyestimates the reaction function directly using gener-
alized method of moments. Both analysis indicate that the central banks react to
expected deviations from an inflation target and from some GDP target. This is the
motivation for calculating a forward-looking Taylor rule for Norway; and it is done
using the Norges Banks own estimates of expected inflation which is published in
their quarterly journal.
Frøyland and Leitemo (1997) calculated the short term interest rates using the
Taylor rule for the period 1985 till1996. Compared to the development of the actual
interest rate, the Taylor-interest rate indicated that the Norwegian monetary policy
was to loose around 1987-88, and too tight from around 1989 till about 1994. The
third section extend this analysis to include the period before 1985 and after 1994,
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and additionally it compares this "backward looking" rule with a forward looking
one.
This paper is organized as follows. In the second section I motivate the Taylor
rule theoretically and in the third section I calculate the original Taylor rate and a
forward-looking rule. The fourth section summarizes the main results.
2 A short motivation for the Taylor rule
To motivate the Taylor (1993)-rule I use a model developed by Svensson (1997). The
model builds 011 two simple equations: t.hefirst equation describes an IS-relationship;
and the second describes the price-setting behavior in the economy. Let Yt denote
the output gap - the percentage deviation of output away from its natural level -
and 7ft and it the rate of inflation and the nominal interest rate - where the latter is
the instrument of the monetary authorities. The variable Xt is exogenous factors. I
follow Svensson (1997) and let the evolution of inflation and output be given by
Yt+l
7ft + Cl!rYt + Cl!2:I:t+ Et+l
/31Yt - /32 [(it - Et7fHI) - 1'*] + /33Xt + 11t-t-l
(/31 + Cl!J/12) Yt - /32 [(it - 7ft) -1'*] + (/33 + /32Cl!2) Xt + 11t-l-1'
,Xt + (Jt+1,
(1)
Xtt]
(2)
(3)
where the second equation in (2) followsfrom inserting for Et7lt+1 = 7ft+a1Yt+Cl!2Xt
from (1). This follows from the assumption that Efl 11t, and (Jf are i.i.d. shocks that
are unknown in period t - l. 1'* is the natural level or steady state real interest
rate. Furthermore, the coefficients a1 and /32 are positive constants, Cl!2 and /33 are
non-negative, and in addition ,81 and, are between zero and one. The first equation
thus describes the price-setting behavior, where the change in inflation is increasing
in lagged values of the output gap. The second equation is the IS-relationship, where
the output gap is serially correlated and depends negatively on deviations of the real
interest rate 1'*. Thus if the real interest rate is equal to the natural level - and the
shock is equal to zero - there will be no additional changes in the output gap, and it
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will gradually return to zero over time. Last, the exogenous factor - Xt - is assumed
to be serially correla ted.
It is clear that equation (l) does not satisfy a natural-rate hypothesis, SInce
an ever-increasing rate of inflation will permanently affect output. However, the
objective function of the central bank - see equation 4 below - will never make
ever increasing rates of inflation optimal policy; and - as noted by Svensson - if the
central bank tries to follow such policies, the model breaks down. l
Monetary policy is conducted by an independent central bank which has an
inflation target equal to the goal of the society rr". First, I follow Svensson and let
controlling the rate of inflation be the sole objective of the central bank. Such regime
is often named "strict inflation targeting". Later I shortly comment the case of an
additional output stabilization, which often is named flexible inflation targeting.
The central bank is assumed to choose a plan for current and future nominal
interest rate to minimize the discounted sum of future period expected losses given
by
(4)
where L ('iT) gives the costs in a period of having a rate of inflation equal to 'iT. It is
thus assumed that the costs are quadratic in the deviation from the inflation target,
and thus the cost function is a special case of a Barro-Gordon2 cost function where
the output gap is not given any weight.
Since the central bank can influence output with one lag, and inflation with two
lags, it is instructive to express the rate of inflation in period t + 2 as a function of
lThe model may be interpreted as an adapting expectations set-up with a NAIRU hypothesis
(for the output gap instead of the rate of unemployment). A break-down of the model is then
interpreted as a situation where fairly moderate individuals cannot have adaptive expectations.
2Barro and Gordon (1983).
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the variables in period t and shocks in period t + 1 and t + 2. This gives
7ft+2 = (7ft+alYt+a2;rt+EI+l)
+al {U~l + Gl/~2) Yl - /32 [(it - /Tt) - r*] + (133 + /32(2) ;rt + 11t+d
(5)
- 7ft + al (1 + ,Bl + al,82) Yt - G}!~2[(it - 7ft) - r*]
+ [G2+ al (,83 + ,B2(2)] XI + EHI + Ct+2 + 1]Hl' (5)
Through changes in the instrument in period t, the central bank can thus influence
inflation in period t + 2, t + 3, "'l but not in period t and t + 1. Likewise, changes in
the instrument in period t + 1, influence inflation in period t + 3, t +..t, "'l but not in
period t + 1 and t + 2. Due to this simple structure -- and since the central bank can
reset the instrument next period - this minimization problem may be described as
sequence of one-period problems of choosing the instrument to hit an inflation rate
two periods lat.er. The problem may thus he described as
which has the following first order conditions:
8Etbs-t L (7fs+2)
Bis
[bs-t (Et7fs+2 - 7f*) (1 + Gf~2)]
E [J:s-t ( - *) 07f
S+2] = Ot v 7f8+2 /T 8'
1s
(7)
Thus, the central bank minimizes its costs hy setting the instrument such that the
expected rate of inflation - two periods later - equals the inflation target.
The expected infiation in period t + 2 - given the information in period t - will
be given by
7ft + G} (1 + f1} + GI!:'12)Yt + [G2+ Gl (/13+ G2!J2)]x,
-Gd~2 [(it - 7ft) - r*]. (8)
Consequently, the optimal level of the monetary policy instrument can he written
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as
7f* 7ft + al (1+ 1'1 + al;32) Yt
+ [a2 + al (;33+ a2/J2)] Xt - aI/32 [(it - 7ft) - r*]
1 * 1+ ,Bl + al/32 *
7f t + -:J- (7ft - 7f ) + 3 Yt + r
aI!'2 .I 2
a2 + al (1'3 + a2(32)+ Xt·ad32
(9)
(10)
Equation (10) is nothing else than a kind of Taylor rule for nominal interest rates,
though the coefficients in front. of the inflation and the output gap - _pl andCl<2
l+Pb:Cl<P2, respectively -- will generally be different from one half. Furthermore,
the rule in equation (10) includes the exogenous factor Xt.
If the rate of inflation is on target, and output gap and the exogenous factor are
zero, the interest rate equal i = 7f* +r", The rule will therefore not be inflationary or
deflationary in the long run, but will provide an anchor for inflationary expectations.
If either the rate of inflation or the real GDP rises above their targets, the interest
rate is increased to dampen the pressure, and opposite if the inflation or real GDP
is below their targets. The same happens if the exogenous fad or is non-zero: a
positive x triggers the central bank to increase interest rate and the opposite for a
negative x. Consequently, the rule is active in the short run.
It is important to note that the central bank in this case does not give weight to
output fluctuations (or to changes in the exogenous factor x) as such in this case,
but it will react to changes in the output gap (or in x) because - all other things
equal- it increases future expected inflation. If the central bank also puts a positive
weight on the output gap - and thereby has a so-called flexible inflation target - the
monetary policy rule will still look like equation (10). There will be one important
change, though, namely that the weights in the instrument rule will change. The
output gap and the exogenous factor x will then enter in the rule both due to the
fad that they predict future inflationary pressure, but also due to the fad that the
central bank wishes to smooth out the changes in the output gap. An increase in the
output gap will then lead to an increase in the short-term interest rates both since
expected inflation increases and since future output gaps increases due to output.
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persistence.
The Taylor rule will only give a reasonable approximation to the interest rate
development under inflation t.argeting if there are no other factors than past inflation
and past output gap that influence the expected inflation and output gap. If this is
not the case, the instrument rule will also include these variables. Still, however, it
will be the case that the instrument is set so that expected inflation hits the inflation
target in the case of strict inflation targeting; and so that a weighted average of the
expected rate of inflation and the output gap is zero in the case of flexible inflation
targeting.
3 Calculations of interest rate rules
3.1 The Taylor rule
The original Taylor-rule is as follows:
(11)
where it is the short run interest rate and 7[ t. _4 is the rate of inflation over the pervi-
ous four quarters. Thus 7[t.-4 = 2::;=1 t1Pt-j, with Pt denoting log of the price level.
Furthermore, Yt = 100 (Yt - Y/) /Y/ where Y is real GDP and Y" is a GDP target.
Taylor suggested using a constant growth of 2.2 per cent for the US (calculated from
1984.1 through 1992.3) to calculate the GDP target. I instead follow Frøyland and
Leitemo (1997) and use the Hedrick-Prescott filtered trend." By doing so I take into
account the possibility that there may be changes in the GDP-trend growth. 7[* is
the inflation target, and r* is the real interest rate. As far as the inflation target is
concerned, I choose the German inflation target. This is done since the authorities
have pegged the Norwegian Krone to European currencies, and therefore it.might be
argued that they implicitly have chosen the German inflation target. This will then
make the hypothetical interest rates more comparable with the actual development
31 have used /\ = 16000 rather than the conventional ,\ = 1600 for quarterly data. This is done
because of the high variations in the Norwegian time series compared to comparable series for the
us.
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in the short run interest rate since the differences does not depend on differences in
the inflation target. The values are taken from von Hagen (1995).4
As far as the real interest rate is concerned I again followFrøyland and Leitemo
(1997) and use 3.5 per cent for the whole period. They justify their choice by
citing studies for the UK. With integrated capital markets the real interest rates
should then be equalized. Interestingly the choice of 3.5 per cent is also close to the
estimated real interest rate for Germany found by Clarida et al. (1998). Last, ).1
and ).2 are the weights put on the output and the inflation goal, respectively. I will
follow Taylor and use ).1 = ).2 = 0.5, which also are the weights chosen by Frøyland
and Leiterno.
3.2 Inflation forecast targeting
The calculations of expected inflation will necessarily be somewhat ad hoc. I have
chosen the simplest possible procedure, namely to use the forecasts published by the
Norges Bank in their quarterly journal 'Penger og Kreditt'. This has the advantage
that it only depends 011 data that surely would have been available for the author-
ities." From the second quarter of 1994 and onwards new estimates of expected
inflation have been published every quarter, while available data before this volume
is much more limited. For most estimates of the expected values in the first and
the third quarter are not available and I have therefore used the published estimates
on quarter in advance. I have calculated a forward-looking rule based on expecta-
tions for four periods including the prevailing period. The rule thus looks like the
41 have used a weighted average of the inflation target for the next four quarters. See the
explanation to the calculation of expected inflation below.
5The disadvantage with this procedure is that it is not sure that these values reflect the true ex-
pectations of the authorities, especially in the early period of the sample. Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1999) argue that inflation is a forward-looking variable, and more precise that it depends on ex-
pected inflation. If the authorities are able to influence the market expectations when they publish
their own expectations, the authorities have an incentive to under-estimate expected inflation to
reduce current inflation.
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following:
. f' f f (e *) *It = 7rt.,3+ lYt.-l + .2 7rt.3 - 7rt + r , (12)
where 7r~,3= Et.-l L~=oL1Pt+j. The specification follows from Clarida et al. (1998)
who consider a rule of the type:
(13)
where i;= r" +7r;, thus a long run nominal interest rate. The parameter, measures
the increase in the nominal interest rate following a one percent increase in the
output gap for a given level of the expected inflation; and the parameter ~~measures
the increase in the nominal interest rate following a one percentage point increase in
expected inflation. Clarida et al. (199g) stress that the latter parameter will have to
be larger than one in order to have an anchor for expected inflation. This will secure
that an increase in expected inflation will lead to an increase in the real interest rate.
Otherwise, if the parameter ,ri is less than one, the real interest rate would decrease
and thus monetary policy would accommodate changes in expected inflation.
This rule in equation (13) can be written as:
lt. r" + 7r; + ,Yt-l +~~(7r~,3 - 7r;)
7r~.3+ 'Yt.-l + (/3 - 1) (7r~,3 - 7r;) + r" ,
which is the rule that I consider with fl = " and f2 = (/3- 1). I therefore denote
the forward-looking rule the Clarida-Calf-Certler (CGG)-rule.
The expected value is simply calculated as an arithmetic mean of the Central
Banks forecasts of inflation for the prevailing and the next year. For instance, the
expected inflation in the second quarter in 1989 is calculated as 7r~.1989= O. 757r~989+
0.257r~990' The weights are now taken to be fl = 0.44 and 12 = 0.73: the change in
the weights is based on two factors, The first is the fact that output serves as a proxy
for expected inflation (together with current inflation) and output stabilization in
the Taylor rule. In this case of the CGG-rule, however, , ideally only is the weight
put on output stabilization. The second is the fact that an average rate of inflation
the last four quarters equal to 7rt.-4 will imply an expected rate of average inflation
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the next four quarters of ITb = aITt.-4, where the factor a will normally be between
zero and one.
The actual choice is based on some back-of-the-envelope calculations in order
to make the two rules comparable. I do this by looking at the ability of the two
variables which enters the Taylor rule to forecast expected inflation, thus I run the
following regression:
(14)
This gave al = 0.03 and a2 = 0.87. Inserting (14) for expected inflation into equation
(13) gives
r" + IT; + '"YYt-1 + /1 (aIYt-1 + a2 (ITt,-4 - ITn)
i;+ b+ ,Ball Yt-I + /3a2 (ITt-1 - IT;).
(15)
Thus ~i+ (Jal = ~and {3a2 = ~,so that r = ~(1 - ~ ) = 0.44 and {3= 2!2 = 1.73,
which are the weights given in the text above.
3.3 The development of short-term interest rates
Figure 1 shows the development of the two hypothetical interest rates rules; the
Taylor rule and the forward-looking rule.I' They are both compared to the develop-
ment of the three-month interest. rate NIBOR. The grids mark periods with changes
in the fixed exchange rates. The Norwegian Krone was devalued with 3 per cent on
June 9 1982, with 2 per cent on February 7 1984, and with as much as 9.2 per cent
on May 5 1986 (see e.g. Alexander et al. 1997). Another two important events were
the linking and de-linking of the Krone to ECU on October 2 1990 and December
10 1992. The shaded areas show the periods where the NIBOR is lower than the
rate indicated by the rule.
A general feature that stands out is that the two hypothetical rules indicate a
rather similar interest rate for most of the time period. However, in some periods
6The data sources are as follows: GDP - Kvarts database, Statistics Norway, CPI - Interna-
tional Financial Statistics, expected inflation - Bank of Norway,.and German CPI - Statistische
Bundesamt.
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Figure 1: Interest Rate Development
the two rules provide different answers on the question whether the actual monetary
policy was too contractionary or too expantionary, I will return to this below.
Both rules indicate first that monetary policy was too loose in the beginning
of the sampling period until some point in 1983; and more precise, the Taylor rule
indicates a too loose monetary policy until the third quarter and the forward-looking
rule until the second quarter.':' The reason for this is seen in figure 2, where I have
plotted the output gap and the inflation gap." This period experienced a sharp
increase in the rate of inflation. where the annual rate increased from 4-5 per cent at
the end of 1979 to 1:3-14 per cent at the end of 1980. As far as the output gap was
7It must be stressed that the interbank rate does not necessarily give an accurate picture of the
stance of monetary policy in this period. The reason is the financial regulations, which were not
abandoned until 198i. First, the interest rates were regulated so that monetary policy was looser
than it looks by looking at NIBOR. And, second, there 'wascredit rationing.
8As the rate of inflation I have used the inflation measure used in the calculating the Taylor
rule, thus the average-price-increase over the past four quarters. The inflation gap is thus the
difference between this inflation measure and the target in that specific quarter.
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Figure 2: Output and Inflation Gaps
concerned, the changes were moderate, which indicate that the increase in consumer
prices were mainly supply driven: and more specific the price increases are related
to the second oil price shock which occurred during 1979. This second oil price
shock caused an international recession, and since Norway was not an "oil country"
yet, the output gap turned negative and the Norwegian economy experienced a deep
recession starting in the end of 1981. The sharp increase in the hypothetical interest
rates thus result from the increases in the rate of inflation. After this period, the
rules indicate a slightly too tight monetary policy. The inflation came down from
11 per cent at the end of 1982 reaching 6 per cent in mid 1984. At the same time
- as noted above - the output gap turned negative at the end of 1981 and stayed
negative until the end of 1984.
Whereas the cycle in the early 1980's may be described as a supply-side distur-
bance, the strong positive cycle around 1985 has every feature of being demand-
driven. It coincides with the final deregulation of the Norwegian credit market,
which led to a loan-financed consumer boom and ended with the crash in the stock
market in the autumn 1987. Inflation rose by more than 4 percentage points from
the first quarter of 1985 till the first quarter in 1987; and at the same time the
output gap went from negative figures in the fourth quarter of 1984, reaching a peak
of remarkable 4.6 per cent in the second quarter of 1986.
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Both interest rate rules indicate a too loose monetary policy in this period, which
also corresponds to the finding in Frøyland and Leitemo (1997).9 Interestingly, the
forward looking rule seems to indicate a somewhat earlier turning point, where the
difference with the actual rate goes from positive to negative figures between the
second and the third quarter of 1985. The difference with the actual interest rate
then rises quickly and stays between 100 and 200 basis points unt.ill it reaches its
maximum in the first quarter of 1986, when the difference rises to slightly more
than 200 basis points. Thereafter the difference falls more or less gradually untill
the third quarter of 1988, where the CGG-rule indicates a lower interest rate than
the actual one. As far as the backward-looking rule is concerned, it indicates a
too loose monetary policy from the fourth quarter of 1986 -- where the difference
between the Taylor rule and the actual interest rate is about 100 basis points. This
is five quarters later than the forward-looking rule: and, in fact, the difference of the
two rules is close to 250 basis points in the second and third quarter of 1986. Later
in the cycle this picture is reversed and the Taylor rule stays considerably above the
CGG-rule until the first quarter of 1989. It is interesting to note that the output
gap in Germany over the same time period showed negative figures (von Hagen
1995), which probably led to the low interest rates during the boom. Furthermore
the Norwegian Krone was devalued in with close to 10 per cent in May 1986, which
most probably fed into the boom.
After the boom that took place around 1986 the Norwegian economy sunk into a
deep recession. Again figure 2 indicates that the recession was demand-driven since
both the rate of inflation and the output gap fell considerably. The forward-looking
rule indicates that monetary policy was too tight from the second quarter of 1988 till
the fourth quarter of 1994; and the Taylor rule indicates a too tight monetary policy
two quarters later. If we look at the actual three-month interest rate over this time
period there was a modest decrease until the second quarter of 1992: between 1989:1
9Compared to their results, I find an interest rate indicated by the Taylor rule that is slightly
higher arround 1987. This is due to two facts: first, they have assumed an inflation target of 2..5
per cent, while I have a target of ~ per cent in this period; second, the output gap is somewhat
higher in my calculat.ious since I use /\ = 16000 when I do the HP-filtering.
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Figure 3: The interest rate rules using expected inflation instead of the German
inflation target.
and 1992:2 the interest rate falls from 11.4 to 10.4. During autumn, the three-month
rate increases due to the defence of the Krone in European exchange rate; but after
the Krone is de-linked from ECU on December 10, 1992, the three month rate falls
considerably during the first part of 1993. Actually, from the peak in the fourth
quarter in 1992 the actual rate falls from above 14 per cent till less than six per
cent a year later. This is then also the turning point of the recession, and from the
beginning of 1995 till some point in 1996 the actual interest rate thereafter keeps
more or less track of the two hypothetical rules. During 1996 the hypothetical rules
start increasing -first the forward-looking rule in the second quarter and then the
Taylor rule in the fourth quarter - and they continue to rise throughout 1997. In
fact, at the same time the actual rate falls with more than 150 basis points between
the third quarter of 1996 and the first quarter of 1997. Thereafter the differences fall
considerably as the Norwegian authorities have to increase interest rate to defend
the Krone during the summer and autumn of 1998.
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It might be argued that using the German inflation goal will overestimate the
hypothetical rules. This is due to the fact that also German inflation overshot the
inflation target in most of the period. One reason for using actual inflation rather
than the inflation target is that the Norwegian authorities have traditionally aimed
at having the same wage and price-development as their main trading partners; and
therefore, they would aim at the German rate of inflation rather than the German
inflation target. In figure 3 I have plotted a measure for the expected German rate
of inflation!" along with the German inflation target. Furthermore I have plotted
the Taylor rule and the CGG-rule when I use t he expected German inflation instead
of the German inflation target as the aim of monetary policy. It is thus clear
from the figure that using the German expected inflation would have led to a not
so tight monetary policy in the early 1980's as the German rate of inflation was
expected to overshoot t.he German target. Around 1986 monet.ary policy would
have been t.ightened even more, however. In this period the Norwegian economy
was III an expansion - with high rates of inflation - while the German economy
was III a recession - with low rates of inflation. Last, German inflation went up
considerably around the unification and at the same time the Norwegian economy
was in a recession with low rates of inflation. Targeting the German expected
inflation would therefore have implied an even looser monetary policy in this period.
In the calculation of the forward-looking rule above I have followed Clarida et
al. (1998) and let the target horizon for expected inflation be one year. However,
th choice of time horizon will depend on how fast changes in the instrument will
affect the targeted variable (here: the rate of inflation). And compared to the US-
economy - which is analyzed by Clarida et al. (1998) -- small open economies like
the Norwegian tend to have a shorter transrnission period. This, therefore, might
favor a somewhat shorter time-horizon than I have chosen. However, as argued by
Ball (1998), a short horizon for the inflation goal increases the danger of a volatile
exchange rate since the exchange rate channel will be the most important for short
lOTo find a measure for expected inflation I have represented the German inflation as an AR( 4)
model. Expected iuflat ion is then found by predicting the rate of inflation four periods in a loop
procedure.
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horizons. And a stable exchange rate has traditionally been an aim of the Norwegian
authorities, which might favor an even longer time horizon.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper I have calculated and compared the Taylor rule and a forward-looking
rule. The former is often used as an indication on how the short-term interest rate
would have been if the exchange rate target would have been abandoned and central
bank had targeted the rate of inflation. However, the Taylor rule will only then give
a reasonable indication if past inflation and past output gaps - the two variables
in the rule - are good proxies for expected inflation. Therefore, I have calculated a
forward-looking rule, which uses expected inflation directly.
The main insight is that both rules indicate a significantly different monetary
policy than the actual one for large periods. Furthermore, it seems that the forward-
looking rule has evolved somewhat differently than the Taylor rule over the economic
cycles. More precise, it seems that the rule increases earlier in economic booms and
falls earlier in economic recessions. In the theoretical literature on inflation target-
ing it is often argued that expected inflation should be the intermediate target for
monetary policy. Therefore, the Taylor rule might give a poor indication of mone-
tary policy under inflation targeting when the economy goes in or out of recessions
or booms.
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ESSAY 4:
A monetary policy rule in practice: the case of
Norway*
Abstract
In this paper I look at the effect on monetary policy of pegging the Nor-
wegian Krone to the European currencies. I estimate a monetary policy rule
for the period 1986 till 1992, and I take into account that the monetary au-
thorities have followed a fixed exchange rate regime. The result is that the
monetary policy set-up accommodated changes in expected inflation in this
period.
"Thanks to Torben Andersen, Jan Tore Klovland, Stefano Neri, and Erling Steigum for com-
ments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1 Introduction
In this paper I look at the effect on monetary policy of pegging the Norwegian Krone
to the European currencies. The paper follows the work of Clarida, Galf and Gertler
(1998, 2000) and estimate a monetary policy rule; but I take into account the fact
that the monetary authorities have followed a fixed exchange rate regime. This is
done byestimating a policy rule based on macroeconomic variables, namely the rate
of inflation and the output gap. Furthermore, I add a foreign interest rate due to
the fixed exchange rate regime. I choose the German short term interest rate since
the German Mark can be considered the anchor currency in the European exchange
rate regime. In addition I follow Holden and Vikøren (1996) and take into account
the fact that the Norwegian Krone was devalued on several occasions preceding the
starting point of the analysis. The common view is that the devaluations reduced
the credibility of the fixed exchange rate, which in turn led to higher interest rate
differentials. I restrict the analysis to the time-period from December 1986 to August
1992 where the monetary policy rule is expected to be stable.
Frøyland and Leitemo (1997) calculate the short term interest rates using the
traditional Taylor (1993)-rule for the period 1985 till 1996. Compared to the de-
velopment of the actual interest rate, the Taylor-rule indicate that the Norwegian
monetary policy was to loose around 1987-88, and too tight from 1989 till about
1994. The first part of this paper differs from Frøyland and Leitemo (1997) in three
important ways. First, I estimate the weights on the rate of inflation and the output
gap implied by the actual development of the short term interest rate rather than
calculating an interest rate rule using the weights suggested by Taylor. Second, I
focus on forward looking variables, and thus I will be able to estimate the weights
on the expected rate of inflation and output gap. In the traditional Taylor-rule the
output gap enters both due to a weight on stabilizing output and due to its ability
to forecast future inflation. Thus the monetary authorities might include the output
gap in the operational rule even if they are not concerned about output fluctuations
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as such.' Third, this analysis take the fixed exchange rate into account and ask how
monetary policy reacted to changes in the foreign interest rate.
Holden and Vikøren (1996) split the interest rate differential into two different
parts - temptation and reputation. The temptation part has similarities with the
monetary policy rule that I consider, but Holden and Vikøren consider past variables
while I look at forward-looking variables. Furthermore, the reputation term is added
to the interest rate differential in their model, while it enters multiplicatively in the
model I consider.
This paper is organized as follows: The econometric approach and the extensions
of the simple rule are described in section two; and the results are discussed in the
third part. The last part summarizes.
2 The econometric approach
The estimation procedure follows the work of Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) and es-
timates a monetary policy rule for Norway using generalized method of moments
(GMM). This is done using the 3-month Norwegian interbank rate (NIBOR) as a
proxy for the monetary policy instruments. Furt herrnore, I use monthly data to gain
degrees of freedom. The estimation is done for the specific time period December
1986 till the break down of the ERM late 1992. I quit the estimation period in Au-
gust 1992 which is before the rapid rise in the short term interest rate in late 1992.
The estimation period thus goes from 86:12 till 92:7. The motivation for choosing
this particular time period is twofold. First, the period is interesting due to the
choice of monetary policy sd-up, namely a fixed exchange rate regime. Secondly,
the monetary policy arrangement was stable over t he time period and the weight
put on achieving the monetary policy goal was high.
lSvensson (199i) develops a model where the operational rule of the monetary authorities will
be a Taylor-type rule both in the case of strict and flexible inflation targeting; but the weights put
on the rate of inflation and the output gap will generally differ in the two cases.
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2.1 The simple rule
The starting point for the estimation is the interest rate rule in Clarida et al. (1998,
2000) given by:
(1)
where superscript "r" denotes rule and i~ is therefore the target for the short-term
interest rate for the time period t. K t.k is the rate of inflation between period t and
period t + kand K* is the inflation target. Yt,Z is the average output gap in the
time period t till t + l. The variable Dt is the information available to the central
bank when it forms its expectations and i* is the long-run average nominal interest
rate. The rule thus calculates a target for the short-term interest rate based on the
expected development of the rate of inflation and the output gap. I follow Clarida
et al. (2000) and assume that the central bank considers the excepted inflation over
the next. year and the average output gap the next half year, thus I use k = 12 and
l = 6.
The rule may be interpreted as a forward-looking Taylor-rule. To see this, note
that the rule may be written as
i~ - (3 [E (Kt.kIDt) - K*] + "IE (Yt,dDt) + T* + K*
E (Kt,kIDt) + (/3 - 1) [E (Kt,kIDt) - K*] + "IE (Yt,zIDt) + T*, (2)
which is equal to the Taylor-rule except from the fact that instead of past inflation
and output gap - as in the Taylor-rule - this rule is based on expected future values
of these parameters. A standard justification of the Taylor-rule - see e.g. Svensson
(1997) - is that past inflation and output gap serve as indicator for future inflation
(and output gap). Due to the fact that monetary policy is expected to influence
these variables with a lag, expected inflation and output gap - rather than their
current values - should be the aim of monetary policy. The rule considered here
hence directly link the interest rate to the targeted variables.
The rule will then work as follows: On average the interest rate implied by the
rule will equal i*, and thus the rule support the inflation target in the long run: the
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nominal interest rate will equal an exogenous (i.e. independent. of monetary policy)
long-run real interest rate plus the inflation target. In the short run. the rule is
active: if either the rate of inflation is above the target or the output gap is positive,
the interest rate will increase and vice versa."
It is a useful exercise to follow Clarida et al. (1998) and look at the implied real
interest rate defined by rT = i[ - E (1ft,,.,IDt).3 Inserting for ir from the interest rate
rule in equation (1) gives:
/3 [E (1ft,,.,IDt) - 1f*] + 'YE (YuIDt) + r" + 1f* - E (1ft,,.,IDt)
(/3 - 1) [E (1ft,A,IDt) - 1f*] + ~iE (Yt,dDt) + r", (3)
The rule thus depends on the two parameters /3 and r in a very specific way. First,
already from equation (1) it is clear that an increase in the expected rate of inflation
will trigger an increase in the nominal interest rate as long as ri > O. However, as
can be seen from equation (3), a positive parameter ,8 is not enough to increase
the real interest following an increase in expected inflation. If (I is between zero
and one, monetary policy will accommodate an increase in expected inflation and
let the real interest rate decrease. This sort of accommodating monetary policy is
reported by Clarida et. aL (2000) for the US before Volcker took over by the end of
the 1970's. If [3 is larger than one, however, the real interest rate also increases if
expected inflation increases. Looking at the value of /3 thus gives a straightforward
method of judging the monetary policy set-up.
One important implication of the sort of accommodating monetary policy implied
by having O < ,B :S 1, is that it may result in higher fluctuations in the rate of
inflation due to self-fulfillingprophesies. The argument goes as follows: Assume that
there is an exogenous increase in expected inflation. The central bank increases the
nominal interest rate (/3 is larger than zero) but the increase in the nominal interest
rate is lower than the increase in expected inflation (/3 is less than one). The real
2A theoretical justification for the forward-looking rule may be found in Clarida, Galf and
Gertler (1999).
3Following Clarida et al. (1998) I have to interpret the real interest rate as an "approximate"
real rate since the maturity of the interest considered - 3 months - is less than the forecast horizon
of inflation - 12 months.
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interest rate therefore decreases, which leads to an increase in aggregate demand.
This increase in demand will in turn increase output and prices; and thus support
the initial increase in expected inflation. If, on the other hand, the central bank
increases the nominal interest rate so that the real interest rate increases (if {3 is
more than one), demand - and thus output and prices - should decrease, which is
incompatible with the initial increase in expected inflation. One important aim of
this analysis will thus be to see whether the Norwegian monetary policy regime have
established a framework that rules out such self-fulfilling prophesies.
The second important parameter in the analysis is T, which says something about
the weight put on output stabilization. In the literature about inflation targeting
a useful distinction is drawn between strict and flexible inflation targeting. By the
former it is mostly referred to a regime where the central bank only puts a positive
weight on stabilizing the rate of inflation around the target, and by the latter to
a regime where the central bank also puts a positive weight on stabilizing other
variables - typically the output gap or the rate of unemployment. Also in the case
of strict inflation targeting other variables mayenter the operating rule - thus a
rule relating the instrument to observable variables - if they help forecast inflation.
A typical example is here the Taylor-rule which thus relates the short term interest
rate to lagged inflation and the output gap. As shown by Svensson (1997) even strict
inflation targeting may give rise to a Taylor-type rule, but the output gap then enters
only due to its ability of forecasting inflation. Another aim of this estimation will
thus be to see how the monetary set-up has reacted to deviations from the natural
level of output.
The rule as it stands above lacks two important aspect of monetary policy which
will make it perform poorly, however. First, I does not consider the fact that the
Norwegian authorities pursued a fixed exchange rate over the time I consider; and,
second, it does not take interest rate smoothing into account.
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2.2 Modifications of the rule
I now modify the rule in order to take into account the fact that the Norwegian
authorities pursued a fixed exchange rate over the time period I consider; and fur-
thermore, I model interest rate smoothing. The former is done by including the
German short term interest rate into the monetary policy rule." More precisely, the
nominal interest rate (rule) i~ is assumed to be a weighted average of a (hypothetical)
domestic and a foreign nominal interest rate rule, thus
·r (l ) ·hr . ·f
1'1 = - Tt lt + r.i; , (4)
where i?r is the domestic interest rate given by the rule in equation (l) above and
if is the foreign interest rate. Last, Tt is the weight on the foreign nominal interest
rate, which may be time-dependent. I will return to the latter below.
There are - at least ~~two possible interpret.at.ions of this equation and both
have some appeal. The first follows Clarida et al. (1998) and says that even a fixed
exchange rate regime may give the monetary authorities some possibilities to follow
domestic object.ives." The parameter T thus gives the weight which the authorities
have to put on the external events due to t he fixed exchange rate obligation.i'
The second interpret at.ion follows from looking at the uncovered interest rate
parity, which states that
(5)
where if is the foreign nominal interest rate, et is the nominal exchange in period t
and thus Et (~et+l) is the expected change in the nominal exchange rate between
period t and t + 1. The variahle q)t is the risk premium. Since the Norwegian
authorities have aimed at a fixed exchange rate, the expected change in the exchange
4Lagged values of the German short-term interest rate FIBOR - eight lags ordered as the other
variables above - are then added to the list of instruments.
5Clarida et al. (1998) give an interpretation of the policy rule of the UK during the so-called
hard ERM along these lines.
6In this case, it might seem reasonable to follow Clarida et al. (1998) and let the weight T be
independent of time,
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rate should in principle be zero. However, the authorities might change t.he parity in
the fixed exchange rate regime - they could choose to devalue/revalue the currency.
The rule in equation (4) can be written as
-r ·fr (1 .) ('hr .fr)1,t = 1t + - Tt. ~t - 1,t , (6)
and the claim is that the devaluation risk will be related to the difference between
the domestic and foreign nominal interest rate rules, thus to (1 - Tt) (iZr - it).
A possible interpretation of the domest.ic interest rate rule - iZr, is the interest.
rate that would have prevailed if the authorities were free to choose the interest
rate and did not have any limitations in their monetary policy. The weight Ti
will hence be related to the probability that the monetary authorities will abandon
the fixed exchange rate obligation and set the interest rate according to the state
of the domestic economy. Furthermore, the domestic interest rate rule i7r is a
function of the domestic expected inflation and output gap and the foreign rate
it likewise a function of foreign expected inflation and output gap. Therefore, the
interest rate differential will be related to the difference between the domestic and
foreign expected inflation and output gaps. The devaluation risk will hence be state
dependent as it maps from differences in rate of inflation and output gaps in the
two countries.
Holden and Vikøren (1996) make the useful distinction between reputation and
temptation in a fixed exchange rate regime. The former captures the idea that. a
weaker government - in the sense that it puts a lower weight on the fixed exchange
rate obligation - will have lower credibility since it - other things equal - will use
devaluations more frequently; and the latter relates to the assumption that a deval-
uation is more likely if there are some macroeconomic imbalances. They consider a
model where temptation is linked to unemployment; if the unemployment in Norway
is high, the interest rate differential with our trading partners will be high, since
the government is tempted to devalue in order to lower unemployment. The idea is
thus to distinguish between the two effects of a devaluation on future credibility as
discussed by Drazen and Masson (1994); a devaluation increase future devaluation
risk since the probability that the government is "weak" is higher, but at the same
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time it decreases future devaluation risk since a reduction in the macroeconomic
imbalance today will tend to persist (there is autocorrelation in e.g. unemployment
and a low unemployment therefore increases the probability of low unemployment
in the near future). Therefore, a devaluation may end up increasing credibility.
Holden and Vikøren (1996) estimate their model using a number of different
variables to express temptation', but a simplified version of their model look like
the following:
(7)
where 7ft,-12 is defined as the average inflation the last 12 months, 'Ut is the rate
of unemployment in period t, and gt is reputation in period t. I will return to the
latter shortly.
Inserting for i~r and if from equation (1), equation (6) may be written as
if + (1- Tt) [/3h (Et7r~\ - 7r*) - ,BI (Et7rL,: - 7r*)]
+ (1 - Tt) [lEtY~1 -1,1 EtyL] .
(8)
The rule I use is thus similar to the rule proposed by Holden and Vikøren (1996).
Compared to the equation (7) above, I focus on expected values of the parameters
rather than past observations. Furthermore, the rule I consider assumes that temp-
tation will depend on the difference between inflation and the target for both the
domestic and foreign country, and it allows for the monetary authorities in the two
countries to put different weights on the inflation goal.8. Finally, the rule includes
a both the domestic and the foreign output gaps, and again it allows for different
weights in the two countries.
Estimating the rule in equation (4) will miss one important aspect of monetary
policy, namely the fact that the Norwegian monetary authorities devalued the Nor-
wegian Krone on several occasions preceding the time period that I consider, last in
7More precisely they, use the rate of unemployment in period t - L the inflation differential,
changes in the real exchange rate over the last twelve months, the trade balance in t -1, the foreign
reserves in period t, and the position of the nominal exchange rate within the band.
8If the weights on the inflation goal are equal in the two countries the rule reduces to the sort
of specification in equation (i).
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May 1986. A common view is that this resulted in low credibility of the fixed ex-
change rate regime, or actually to low reputation, which in turn led to high interest
rate differentials. This is captured by Holden and Vikøren (1996) in their parameter
gt above. They construct this term as
gt b-curn. (dev)t + b2cu'm (de1})t + b3 [c'urn (dev)t]2
deo, (it - if) - Et [~Xt+t [no realignment] ,
where Et [~Xt+t [nr] is the expected change in the nominal exchange rate within
the band (given no realignments of the peg) and thus dev is expected devalua-
tion. Holden and Vikøren (1996) argue that reputation will depend on accumulated
expected devaluations, which again both will depend on the period since the last
devaluation and the size of the devaluation expectation each period. They use the
function above, which also will capture non-linearities in the effect of devaluation
expectations.
I will use a simplified approach proposed by Chen and Giovannini (1993):
where td is the point in time of the last realignment. In the case of a devaluation,
reputation will thus be Oand it will increase graduallyas the time period since the
last devaluation increases. Holden and Vikøren (1996) estimate the model for the
time period 78:12 till 92:12, thus a period involving four devaluations ofthe Krone.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to take the nature of past devaluations into account
in the way they suggest. I look at a shorter time period without any devaluations
and thus the simplified function should therefore give a reasonable approximation.
Holden and Vikøren (1996) assume that reputation enters additively into the
interest rate differential. I will, on the other hand, assume that reputation enters
multiplicatively. The argument for doing this is that reputation should only affect
the interest rate differential if the monetary authorities would have set a different
interest rate than in the foreign country: If the domestic interest rate rule coincides
with the foreign interest rate, the domestic monetary authorities do not wish to set
a different interest rate even if they were able to, so the interest rate differential
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should be zero. I therefore consider the following specification, where reputation
enters multiplicatively:
i; - if = (1- bln(l + t - td)) (i~r- if), (9)
where thus the term bIn (1 + t - td) equals the Tt in equation above. The rule
in equation (4) above might therefore be interpreted as follows: the interest rate
is a weighted sum of the foreign interest rate and the rate which the authorities
would choose if they abandon the fixed exchange rate: and weights are linked to the
reputation of the regime.
As noted above, the rule in equation (9) lacks interest smoothing. This is the
observation that most central banks are reluctant to change the interest rate rapidly,
and instead smooth out the interest rate changes over several periods." Therefore,
before turning to the estimation, I will have to take into account the possibilit.y of
interest. rate smoothing. To do this I followHolden and Vikøren (1996) and assume
that the interest rate differential is given by:
it - if = (l_'~f Pm ) (.r 'f) 1~1 (, ,f)}'t - lt + Z:: Pm 'It-m - It-m + Vt.
m.=l
(10)
where Pm measures the weight put on the interest rate differential m months ago,
and the sum of the weights is between zero and one. With a one period interest rate
smoothing, the interest rate differential will be given by:
, 'f_(l )('r 'f) (, 'f)'lt - 'lt - - P 'lt - 'lt + P 1t-1 - 'lt-1 + Vt· (l1)
The error term - which is assumed to be i.i.d. - might be considered as unex-
plained parts of monetary policy. Another possibility is that it comes from the fact
that the interbank rates is not directly controlled by the monetary authorities. The
Norwegian central bank sets the overnight. lending rate and the deposit rate, and
the NIBOR will (normally) fluctuate between these.l"
9Rebelo and Xie (1999) discuss the optimality of interest rate shoothing in cash-in-advance
models, while Goodhart (1996) discusses interest smoothing in a more general setting,
laThe error term Vt will also include a risk premium. which is thus assumed to be stationary,
Akram and Frøyland (199i) estimate the relationship between Norwegian and European (Euro)
short-term interest rates between 1989:11 and 1996:5 and cannot reject a hypothesis of a stationary
risk premium,
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Inserting for the interest rate given by the rule in equation (9) into the actual
interest rate differential in equation (11) I get:
1'1 = (1 - p) (bo - bl In (1 + t - td))
X {[!1 (E (ITt.klnt) - IT*) + ,E (Yt.dnt) + r" + IT*]- if}
+p (it-l - iLl) + 'Ut,
where the latter equality followsfrom inserting for i~ from equation (1). This equa-
(12)
tion cannot be estimated directly since the equation depends on unobservable vari-
ables; the expected inflation and the expected output gap. To be able to do so, I
write the interest rate rule using realized values as follows:
Zt = (l - p) (bo - bl In (1+ t - td)) {[I) (ITt,k - IT*) + 'Yt.l + r" + IT*]- if}
+p (it-l - iLl) + Et
- (1 - p)(bo - bl In (1+ t - td))
{ /) .f} (. 'f)_X Q + PITt.k + 'YI,I - lt + P 11-1 - 1,t-l + et, (13)
where
(14)
Et - (l - p) (bo - bl In (1 + t - td))
X {jJ [ITt,k - E (ITt,klnt)] +, [Yt,l - E (Yt,dnt)]} +Vt. (15)
The error term is now a linear combination of the disturbance Vt and the errors in
forecasting inflation and output given the information set n. Following Clarida et
aL (2000) the disturbance has a MA(k - 1) representation (since k > l).
To estimate (13) I use a set of instruments Ut E n" which are thus assumed to
be part of the information set of the central bank and - in addition - orthogonal
to the interest rate shock lit. I use eight lags - ordered 1 to 6, 9 and 12 - of the
following variables: the Norwegian and German three month interest rates NIBOR
and FIBOR;ll the changes in the average output gap and inflation;12 the changes
11For these series only seven lags - ordered 2 to 6, 9 and 12 - are used since their first lag enters
the monetary policy rule.
12The output gap is calculated using the Hedrick-Prescott filter on quarterly data for the main-
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in the log of the real exchange rate;13 the changes in the real oil price.1415 I assume
rational expectations. Therefore, since the instruments are assumed to be part of
the information set of the market participants when they form their expectations
about future inflation and output gap, it is thus assumed that E (EtlUt) = O. This
therefore give us a set of orthogonality conditions:
o = E { (1 - p) (bo - bl In (1 + t - td)) [Cl + ,Bn t,k + ,Yt,t - if]
+p (it-l - iLl) lUt} , (16)
thus one for each of the instruments in Ut.
To estimate equation (16) I utilize Gl'vnvl with instrument variables. This is
a two-step procedure (see e.g. Doan, 1996: 5-22 and 5-23). In the first step
the non-linear model is estimated using non-linear least squares; and the residuals
are used to construct an optimal weighting matrix. whereby taking into account
that the residuals have a MA(ll) representation. In the second step the model is
reestimated - again using non-linear least squares - using the new weighting matrix,
The overidentifying restrictions in the estimation is tested using a x2-test.
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Figure 1: Actual and estimated short-term interest rate.
3 The results
The results of this estimation are given m table 1; and in figure 1 I have plotted
the actual three months interest rate NIBOR and the estimated interest rate. The
latter is calculated using realized values of the rate of inflation and the output gap.
It is clear from the figure that the interest rate rule is able to explain large part
land GDP from 1978:1 till 1998:2. I considered using a weighted average of industrial production
and construction, but found that it was a poor indicator of mainland GDP. This is probably due to
the increase in non-tradables over the time period as the oil sector has become increasingly more
important. The monthly "observations" of the six-month - thus two-quarter - average output gap
is constructed as a weighted average of quarterly data. For example, the average output gap for
the period starting in the February is constructed as a weighted average of the first three quarters:
the first quarter has weight two sixth, the second one half, and the third one sixth.
13The real exchange rate is defined as q = e+]l' - p, where e is the log of the nominal exchange
rate (a basket of exchange rate with weights based on trade) and p' and p are the foreign and
domestic price level in logs.
14The real oil price is calculated using the price of Brent Blend in dollars, transformed into the
Norwegian currency by the spot price and deflated by the producer price index.
15Except GDP - which is taken from the Kvarts database, Statistics Norway - the series are
taken from International Financial Statistics.
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of the development of the actual short term interest rate. le The general decreases
in the interest rate between 1986:12 and 1989:1 and between 1989:7 and 1991:5 are
well explained by the rule. Furthermore, the rule indicates a rather stable interest
rate from 1991:6 to the end of the estimation period. Some developments seem hard
to explain, however. This is especially true for the rapid increases in interest rates
which occurred at the end of 1987, and at the end of 1990. I will return to possible
explanations for this below.
Table 1
Variable Coefficient Std Erro T-Stat Significance
constant 8.1536 0.5265 15.4852 0.00000000
P 0.8303 0.0084 98.3031 0.00000000
,8 1.4729 0.1173 12.5583 0.00000000, 0.4289 0.0881 4.8G67 0.00000113
b 0.1114 0.0058 19.1809 0.00000000
Test of overidentifying Restrictions:
X2(44) = 6.392334 with significance 0.99999999
The estimation thus implies an interest smoothing of 0.83, which is somewhat
lower than reported by Clarida et al. (1998) for the G3 countries: they find 0.91 for
Germany, 0.93 for Japan and 0.92 for the US.
The main findings of this paper concern the parameters {3and, in the domestic-
based monetary policy rule - the term denoted temptation, which relates the short-
term interest rate to the development of expected inflation and expected output
gap. Both parameters are significant with t-statistics of 12.6 and 4.9 for ,8 and
"respectively. As far as the former parameter is concerned the monetary policy
authorities wish to increase the nominal interest rates by 147 basis points when
expected domestic inflation increased by one percentage point; and thus the real
interest rate by 47 basis. Likewise, nominal (and real) interest rates increased by
43 basis points when expected domestic output gap increased by one percentage
16Notice that I have plotted the interest rate rule and thereby not taken interest rate smoothing
into account. By doing so, I would improve the fit.
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Figure 2: The development of /3total and ,total through time.
point. Therefore, this indicates that monetary policy did not want to accommodate
either increases in expected inflation or increases in expected output gap. The
comparable estimates for the G3 countries reported by Clarida et aL (1998) are
1.31 for Germany, 2.04 for Japan, and 1.79 for the US. The monetary policy rule
estimated for the Norwegian authorities thus have the same characteristics as the
rule estimated by Clarida et al for the G3 countries.
The monetary authorities in the G3 countries and Norway differ in one impor-
tant aspect, however, namely the fixed exchange rate obligation. Due to this, the
Norwegian central bank was not free to set the short-term interest rate, but it had
to set interest rates to defend the exchange rate parity. This is the reason why the
foreign interest affects significantly the Norwegian short-term interest rate. To find
how an increase in the expected inflation or an increase in the expected output gap
affect the interest rate, I have to take into account the development of reputation.
This is done in figure 2, where I have plotted the total inflation and employment
gap parameters given by ø~otal = (1 - Tt) /3 and 'Y~otal = (1 - Tt) 'Y, respectively.
This indicates that the monetary policy set-up led monetary policy to accommo-
date changes in expected inflation in most of the time period!", while output were
17 j3total falls below unity in period 87:10.
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stabilized. As far as the former is concerned, the monetary policy - due to the fixed
exchange rate set-up - thus did not manage to rule out self-fulfilling prophecies
about the expected rate of inflation: exogenous increases in expected inflation led
to decreases in the real interest rate. This may therefore - in itself - give a possible
explanation of some of the variation in short-term interest rates. Since monetary
policy supported multiple equilibria in prices, the changes in the short term interest
rate may have come about due to self-fulfilling changes in expected (and realized)
inflation.
The problem was thus that due to the external the monetary policy set-up did not
provide an anchor for expected inflation. This intuition lacks one important aspect
of international economics, however, namely the purchasing power parity (PPP).18
If the PPP holds, this in itself would provide an anchor for expected inflation since
the relative PPP states that 'iTt = 'iT{ + !::let + !::lkt, where kt is the real exchange rate
and !::lkt captures real exchange rate changes due to different developments in e.g.
domestic and foreign non-tradable productivity. Unfortunately, most empirical tests
of the PPP concludes that at most it holds only in the very long run - even when
differences in productivity in the non-tradable sector is properly taken into account
(see e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff: Chapter 4.1 and 4.2). Therefore, the domestic rate of
inflation may hence wander away from the long-run equilibrium for a considerable
time period before the law of one price eventually bites; and hence, there are no
guarantees that self-fulfilling prophesies could not appear.1920
18Actually, one reason to peg the nominal exchange rate is to borrow credibility about the
inflation target.
19The so-called "solidarity alternative" - thus the division of responsibility of Norwegian eco-
nomic policy that was put in place during 1992 - may, in principle, solve this problem. Monetary
policy is responsible for stabilizing exchange rates, fiscal policy for stabilizing output and the
largest of the trade unions is responsible for wage-moderation and thus for stabilizing prices (see
e.g. Alexander, Green and Arnason (199i)). However, there is little evidence that the solidarity
alternative in itself constributed to wage-moderation (Alexander et al) beyond the fact that the
high rates of unemployment in the early 1990's gave little preassure on wages.
20Note that having a monetary policy rule with O :S !3 < 1 is not a sufficient condition for
self-fulfilling prophesies to appear. In addition, this will depend not only on the PPP. but on the
whole structure of the economy.
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The estimated constant will be given by
constant r" + 7r* + [ti) (Jf - 7r*) + /'yl + <1>0
r" + (1 - (3) 7r* + (]if + 'Ty + <1>0'
where Jf and y are average inflation and average output gap, respectively, and <1>0 is
the average risk premium. The constant thus consists of three parts: The first part
is the average (long-run) nominal interest rate i* - the long-run real interest rate
plus the inflation target. The second part - the term in the square brackets in the
first equality above - reflects that the average inflation and output gaps have been
different from zero over this time period. The last part is a constant risk premium,
<1>0' Since both i* and cPo are unknown, these parameters cannot be estimated.
However, by choosing a reasonable real interest rate and assuming that the constant
risk premium is zero'"; I can calculate the implied inflation target. This will be
given by
* constant - r* - (]if - /,y
IT = 1-(3 .
and letting r" = 3.5 - which is the value chosen by Frøyland and Leitemo (1997) to
calculate the Taylor rule for Norway - gives IT* = 2.35. This corresponds well to the
German inflation target, which was equal to 2 percentage points in this period (see
e.g. von Hagen 1995).22
In figure 3 I have plotted the interest rate differential, temptation, and - using
the right hand scale - reputation. The figure shows how the interest rate differential
decreases both due to the decrease in temptation and the increase in reputation.
The former decreases both because the Norwegian economy went into a recession
which eventually brought inflation down; and because the danger of German inflation
after the re-union, which led the Bundesbank to increase short-term interest rates.
Furthermore, the high interest rate differential in the beginning of the time period
211n fact, Akram and Frøyland (1997) report a zero average risk-premium between Norwegian
and Euro 3-month interest rates over the time period 1989 to 1996. Furthemore, Holden and
Vikøren (1996) also assume a zero average risk premium in their analysis.
22Calculating T* assuming that the inflation target equals 2 percentage points gives T* = 3.34.
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Figure 3: Temptation and reputation compared to the interest rate differential.
was not only lack of reputation; but low reputation combined with the state of the
domestic economy.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper I have estimated a monetary policy rules for Norway, where I explicitly
take the fixed exchange rate setting into account. This was done by introducing
the German short-term interest rate and by taking into account the development
of credibility. The latter was modelled consisting of two parts; reputation and
temptation. The estimation period was December 1986 to August 1992 and the main
finding was that the monetary policy set-up seems to have accommodated changes
in expected inflation. Therefore, monetary policy did not provide a sufficient anchor
for short or medium term expected inflation which may have led to self-fulfilling
prophecies about the development of the rate of inflation.
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ESSAY 5:
Inflation targeting in a monetary union with
non-coordinated fiscal policy"
Abstract
The paper discusses coordination problems in a monetary union - with
an independent central bank. It is shown that lack of coordination between
monetary and fiscal policy leads to a state-contingent bias in that the fiscal
authorities react to changes in core inflation. Furthermore, lack of coordina-
tion between the fiscal authorities will lead to a stabilization bias, in that the
fiscal authorities do not react correctly to idiosyncratic shocks. The nature
of the stabilization bias will depend on whether the fiscal authorities act as
Stackelberg leaders in the game with the central bank.
'Thanks to Torben Andersen and Erling Steigum for comments and suggestions. The usual
disclaimer applies.
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1 Introduction
Since the first of January 1999 the European Central Bank (ECB) has been re-
sponsible for conducting monetary policy in most of the countries in the European
Union.' This implies that the national central banks no longer have the responsi-
bility to conduct monetary policy, but only to supply money to meet the demand
given the interest rates set by the ECB. Moreover, the principal goal of the ECB is
to ensure price stability; and they are only supposed to foster the general economic
development in the union when this does not compromise with the principal goal.2
The major drawback with the European Monetary Union (EMU) is that the
participating countries can no longer use countercyclical monetary policy when their
economies are hit by an idiosyncratic shock." Furthermore, the loss of monetary
policy sovereignty implies that fiscal policy has become more important, since it is
still conducted by the individual countries."
In this paper I focus on the countercyclical function of fiscal policy in a monetary
union. There is a common central bank, which is assumed to be independent from
the fiscal authorities. Besides, there are fiscal authorities in each country deciding
upon fiscal policy. In such a set-up, the paper discusses strategic interactions in
two dimensions. The first dimension is the interaction between the fiscal authorities
- seen as a group - and the central bank. In one set of cases the game between
the monetary and fiscal authorities is modelled as a simultaneous Cournot game.
This situation is thus intended to describe the situation in which either the fiscal
authorities have no information about the action of the central bank, or in which
the fiscal authorities cannot commit to a level of fiscal spending and will change it
lThe European Monetary Union includes all the countries in the European Union except the
United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark.
2For a thoroughly discussion of monetary policy and institutions in the European monetary
union see von Hagen (199i).
3In any case, it might be argued that the advantage with the EMU is that the ECB willlook at
the general economic development in the whole area, whereas the Bundesbank conducted monetary
policy based only on the economic situation in Germany.
40nly a small fraction of GDP in each of the countries is canalized to a union-wide fiscal
authority.
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after the monetary authorities have set the real interest rate. In the other set, fiscal
authorities act as a Stackelberg leader. The second dimension is the interaction
between the two fiscal authorities themselves; and here I also discuss two types
of situations. In the first the authorities act independently and take each others
actions as given, and in the second the authorities coordinate. In total this gives
four possible strategic interactions.
There already exists literature on the coordination between fiscal and monetary
policy," Andersen and Schneider (1986) look at the problem of coordination in the
cases where both the monetary and the fiscal authorities cares about variations in
output and inflation, but they are allowed to have different output and inflation
goals and to put different weights on achieving the two goals. Their main result
is that - within a Keynesian framework - fiscal policy is too expansionary and
monetary policy is too contractionary. Both Nordhaus (1994) and Agell et al. (1996)
are concerned with fiscal deficits and inflation. The former discusses the problems
of debt reduction in the case of non-coordinated monetary and fiscal policy; and
the latter deals with time-inconsistency problems and the choice of exchange rate
regime. Tornell and Velasco (1995) also focus on the choice of exchange rate regime,
but their aim is to discuss fiscal discipline. Alesina and Tabellini (1987) discuss non-
coordinated monetary and fiscal policy with credibility problems, but as opposed to
the case discussed by Agell et al. (1996), only monetary policy is subject to the time-
inconsistency problem. Last, Leitemo (1999) discusses the coordination problem in
an open economy when monetary policy is tied to an inflation target and the fiscal
authority is concerned about a broad set of macroeconomic variables. I adopt the
set-up discussed by Leitemo (1999). The model is extended, however, to include a
monetary union.
In a monetary union set-up, Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) discuss the interac-
tion between a union central bank and national fiscal authorities, where the aim of
fiscal policy is to provide public goods. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) analyze the
fiscal policy by myopic governments and argue that a monetary unification increases
the accumulation of public debts. Therefore, debt ceilings may play an important
5See e.g. Nordhaus (1994) for an overview of the literature.
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role in reducing the accumulation of debt and allow the central bank to focus on the
goal of price stability. In addition, if the economies are hit by supply shocks debt
targets that limit countercyclical policy may help to reduce debt variability. This
analysis is extended in Beetsma and Bovenberg (2000) to allow for a heterogeneous
union. In such case the debt target will have to be state-contingent. However, An-
dersen and Sørensen (1995) construct a general equilibrium model with imperfect
competition in both product and labour markets and show that even balanced fiscal
policy may affect unemployment.P Consequently, a debt or deficit rule may not be
enough and a restriction on the size of the public sector would be necessary. Van
Arle and Garretsen (2000) discuss how national fiscal policy can be used as demand
management in different asymmetric settings. This paper also discusses fiscal sta-
bilization, but as opposed to van Aarle and Garretsen (2000) the main objective
is to discuss different strategic interactions between the central bank and the fiscal
authorities. In this respect, the paper bears similarities with Dixit and Lambertini
(2000). Their starting point is the debate about excessive use of fiscal policy to stabi-
lize business cycles. They construct a Barro-Gorden model extended to a monetary
union and reason that as long as the central bank and the fiscal authorities have
the same goals for output and inflation, the first-best can be achieved irrespective of
whether the fiscal authorities move first or second and whether the fiscal authorities
cooperate or they do not. Additionally, there is no need for monetary commitment.
This paper differs from Dixit and Lambertini (2000) in one important way, however,
namely that the central bank is tied up to an inflation target. Consequently, the
central bank has a different goal from the fiscal authorities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the second part the model econ-
omy is described, including the objective and the behavior of the common central
bank and the objective of the fiscal authorities. The third part contains the dis-
cussion about four different strategic interactions between the central bank and the
fiscal authorities. Moreover, the fourth part extends the basic set-up and considers
6Nonetheless, in the union as a whole, unemployment is unaffected and as a result the decrease
in the rate of unemployment in one country comes about through an increase in unemployment in
the rest of the countries.
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the case when the fiscal authorities are concerned about real echange rate variability,
and the fifht part concludes.
2 The model
The analytical framework follows Leitemo (1999) and will thus be a Ball (1998)
model, but it is extended to include two countries with a common independent
central bank. The model is Keynesian and both monetary and fiscal policy are able
to influence output in the short run, but a positive output gap induces inflationary
pressure, which will reduce the output gap over time. The fiscal authorities use
government spending to pursue a set of goals, whereas the central bank only has
one goal and will use the real interest rate in order to bring the expected rate of
inflation in line with the inflationary target.
The real exchange rate plays a crucial role in the model. It is linked to the
central bank instrument and influences both output and the rate of inflation. The
former is affected by the real exchange rate in a standard way: an increase in the
real exchange rate - a real depreciation - will increase the demand for domestically
produced goods. The latter is affected by an increase in the real exchange rate
through two different channels: first, the (consumer price) inflation is increased by
increasing prices of imported goods; and, second, inflation is increased over time
due to the increase in demand for domestically produced goods.
I let all the variables below be measured as a deviation from the long-run or
steady-state values. The short-run supply side of each of the two economies is given
by a wage curve
(1)
where ~ is the difference operator, and for each of the two countries w is the nominal
wage, 7rC is consumer price inflation, and y the output gap - the percentage deviation
from steady state production. Cj is an idiosyncratic supply shock in country i,
which independently identically distributed with zero mean and eau (clt) C2t) = o.
Consequently, the supply shocks of the two countries are independent of each other.
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Equation (1) implies that wage-earners are compensated for past consumer price
inflation and that the wage rate depends on the state of the economy represented
by the output gap. This can be rationalized by the assumption that wage-setters
have adaptive expectations about the consumer price inflation.
The domestic producers operate under monopolistic competition and set prices as
a mark-up over unit-cost, which is assumed to be given by the wage rate. Therefore,
if the mark-up is normalized to zero7, the relationship between the wage rates and
the domestic price levels will given by
(2)
The producers in both countries are price-takers internationally. It is assumed
that the prices of imported goods - denoted p~- are equal in the two countries, and
they are given by
i + *Pt = St Pt, (3)
where St is the nominal exchange rate and p* is the price leveloutside the monetary
umon. This implicitly assumes that there is a direct pass-through from foreign
pnces. Consequently, I assume the law of one price for the imported goods.
The real exchange rate is defined as ejt = St +P; - Pjt, and imported prices may
therefore be written as
(4)
The consumer price is a weighted average of imported prices and the two domestic
price levels in the two countries in the monetary union. It is assumed to be given
bv:"v •
pjt = cPp~+ fLPjt + (1 - cP- fL) Pit for j, i = 1,2 and j =1= i, (5)
7This is done for analytical convenience, since imperfect competition does not play any signifi-
cant role in this analysis.
8This can be justified by a Cobb-Douglas utility function of the form:
where xl is the consumption of imported goods consumed in country i, and Xji is the consumption
of goods in country j which are produced in country i. The ideal consumer price-index is found
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where ¢ is the proportion of "foreign" goods in the consumption bundle, and /1 is
the proportion of domestic goods. The consumer price inflation will therefore be
given by
7rJt ¢7r~+ /17rjt + (1 - ¢ - /1) 7rit
- ¢ (~ejt + 7rjt) + /17rjt + (1 - ¢ - /1) 7rit
(¢ + /1) 7rjt + ¢~ejt + (1 - ¢ - /1) 7rit, (6)
where the second equality follows from using the first difference of equation (4).
To find the equation describing the evolution of the domestic inflation, I take
first difference and lead equation (2), and thereafter I insert for the change in the
wage rate from equation (1) and for consumer price inflation from equation (6). This
gives the domestic inflation in each of the two countries as
The demand side of the economies is described by an aggregate demand rela-
by maximizing the utility function subject to a budget constraint. If Wj denotes wealth used on
consumption, this will result in the following levels on consumption (dropping country-subscript
for simplicity):
* W W ( )W
X = cP P* ,Xl = Jl' Pl ,X2 = 1- cP - f-l P2'
where P* and Pj are the prices of goods produced abroad and in country j. Inserting this into the
utility function, the ideal consumer price index can be calculated as pc = ~, thus as:
and thus with small letters indicating the log of the variable and by choosing an appropriate
numerator, the price index can be normalized to
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tionship
Yjt = fl, ({3ejt + ligjt + Ujt) + (1 - fl,) ({3eit + ligit + Uit) for j,i = 1,2 and j =I- i,
(8)
where ejt the real exchange rate in country j, gjt government. spending in country
j, and Ujt is an idiosyncratic i.i.d. demand shock in country j. 9 The parts in
the two brackets are the demand from inhabitants in country j and i, respectively.
Therefore, the aggregate demand in country j is a weighted average of the demand
from the inhabitants in the monetary union, where the weight.on own inhabitants is
given by fl,.10 As a result, demand increases with the country-specific real exchange
rate, and increases with domestic spending.
Turning to the union-wide development of the different price indicators and ag-
gregate demand, it is assumed that the two countries have equal size. Accordingly,
for each of the variables, the union-wide average will be given by
For that reason the average consumer price will be given by
P~ = ~ (¢p~ + fl,Plt + (1 - ¢- fl,) P2t + ¢p~ + fl,P2t + (1 - ¢- fl,) PIt)
. 1
¢p~ + "2 (( 1- ¢) P2t + (1- ¢) PIt)
- ¢p~ + (1 - ¢) Pt = Pt + ¢et, (9)
since
(10)
Therefore, average consumer price inflation will be given by
(11)
9The demand shocks in the two countries are independent of each other.
10An obvious short-coming with this is that the demand does not depend on the real interest
rate. A more satisfying specification would be to let the demand from the inhabitants in the two
countries depend on their respective country-specific real interest rate given by it - Et7fjt+1' This
will, however, complicate the algebra considerably, and I will abstract from this here.
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and domestic price inflation within the union will evolve as
1
7fHI "2 [(</> + JL) 7flt+ </>!J.elt + (1 - </> - JL) 7f2t+ ,Ylt + CIHI
+ (</> + JL) 7f2t+ </>!J.e2t+ (1 - </> - JL) 7flt+ 'Y2t + c2HI]
7ft+ </>!J.et+ ,Yt + Ct+l· (12)
Furthermore, average aggregate demand in the union is given by
(13)
and last, the uncovered interest rate parity holds
where rand r" are the average and foreign real interest rate. For simplicity, it is
assumed that Etr;+l = 0, hence the foreign real interest rate is not auto-correlated
(and therefore the expected future value is zero since the variable is measured as
a deviation from the steady-state value). This implies that the union-wide model
reduces to the set-up used by Leitemo (op.cit.) except from the important fact that
government spending will not average the same function as in the single-country.
The central bank targets average core inflation, which is defined as
(14)
By leading (14) and replacing domestic inflation from equation (12), I get a process
for core inflation
jt+l - 7ft+ </> (et - et-l) + ,Yt + CHI - </>et
Kt+ ,Yt + CHI· (15)
The central bank sets the average real interest rate so that
(16)
which implies that
~
7ft= -'Yt· (17)
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Inserting from equation (17) into the union-wide aggregate demand
function (equation 13) and solving for the average real exchange rate, gives
1(1~ )et - -73 17ft + K,gt + Ut .
In order to find a function for the real interest rate, I have to find the funda-
(18)
mental solution for the real exchange rate, which is a forward-looking variable due
to the interest rate parity. As noted above the union-wide model can be described
exclusively by union-wide aggregates, thus by the aggregate demand function, the
uncovered interest rate parity, the supply function, and the monetary policy func-
tion, equations (13), (10), (15), and (16), respectively. Therefore, since there is no
auto-correlation in the variables describing the union as a whole - due to the set-up
of the model and the assumption of symmetric and equal sized countries - it must
be that EteHl = oY This implies
T* - Ttt '1(1~ Q * )73 17ft + K,gt + VTt + Ut .
(19)
(20)
Therefore, the central bank increases real interest rates if current core inflation is
above target in order to reduce future core inflation via lower aggregate demand.
Further, it will react contractionary both to an increase in government spending and
to a positive demand shock. This is due to the fact that a higher aggregate demand
increases future core inflation. Last, the central bank reacts positivelyon increases
in foreign real interest rates, which lead to a real depreciation and thus to higher
aggregate demand.
The fiscal authorities are concerned about variations in the output gap and
government spending and they are assumed to minimize the following quadratic
IISo far I have not discussed the actions of the two governments. The spending of the individual
countries might be auto-correlated in itself or the average government might' depend on the distri-
bution between the two countries due to convexities. The discussion below makes clear, however,
that there is no auto-correlation in average government spending either.
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cost function: 12
(21)
where parameter ""y is related to the costs of having a fluctuating output gap (and
thereby fluctuating employment), and ""g measures the costs of changing government
spending according to the economic situation.
An obvious short-coming of this specification (except the points made in the
footnote above), is that I have not included a rate of inflation. In the single-country
model described by Leiterno, this may be rationalized by some division of respon-
sibility, since politicians may not be concerned about fluctuations in the rate of
inflation if it is a well-known fact in the public that the central bank is responsible
for controlling inflation. In my model, on the other hand, the central bank only
cares about the union-wide rate of inflation. Therefore, one might argue that the
fiscal authorities would - or even should - consider their individual rate of inflation.
However, as a convenient simplification, I will assume that the fiscal authorities are
not. concerned about variations in the rate of inflation. Moreover, this will not affect
the main results of the analysis.
Note that from the definition of the real exchange rate and the relationship
between the average real exchange rate and the real interest rate, the country specific
real exchange rate can be written as13
St + P; - Pjt = et + Pt - Pjt
- et - (1fjt - 1ft).
(22)
Inserting this into equation (8) for the country specific real exchange rate, and
then substituting the average real exchange rate from equation (18), I can write a
12This differs from the cost function discussed by Leitemo (op.cit.) in that I do not include the
real interest rate and the real exchange rate. The former is a natural consequence of ruling out
the real interest rate from the aggregate demand function. As far as the latter is concerned, I will
turn to this case below. Nevertheless, to simplify the model initially, I will first consider the case
where the fiscal authorities do not care about real exchange rate variations.
13The latter equality follows from normalizing the price indexes so that Pjt-I = Pt-I.
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reduced-form equation for the output gap as follows:
Yjt = - (~7rt+l'\;gt+Ut) +,8nt
+J-t (I'\;gjt + Ujt - ,81rjt) + (1 - J-t) (I'\;git + Uit - ,8nit)
-~7rt + (J-t - ~) [I'\; (gjt - git) + Ujt - Uit - ,8 (njt - 1rit)] (23)
Yt + 2 (J-t - ~) [I'\; (gjt - gt) + Ujt - Ut - ,8 (njt - nt)] , (24)
where the two latter equalities follow from the definitions of average government
spending and demand shock. These equations therefore show how fiscal spending in
one country will affect the output gap in the other country both through demand
spill-overs and through changes in monetary policy. It is noteworthy, though, that
with J-t > ~ - thus the normal case where government spending has the largest im-
pact in the domestic economy - an increase in government spending in country i
will decrease the output gap in country j. The reason why the monetary policy
channel dominates the demand-spill-over-channel is due to the monetary policy tar-
get. Following an exogenous increase in gjt, the monetary authorities will increase
real interest rates so that the average output gap remains constant. Therefore, since
the increase in git influences Yit more than Yjt, Yjt will have to fall in order for the
average output gap to stay constant. If J-t = ~- thus if the effects government
spending in country j will be equally distributed between the two countries - the
output gap in country j will be equal to the union-average. The reason is that the
fiscal authorities no longer have the possibility of local demand management.
3 The strategic set-ups
I focus on four different strategic interactions between the fiscal authorities and the
monetaryauthority. I start with the case where the two fiscal authorities coordinate
- or cooperate - and they act as Stackelberg leaders in the game with the central
bank. In the second case, the two fiscal authorities do not coordinate, and they play
a Cournot game with the central bank. In order for the fiscal authorities to be able
to act as Stackelberg leaders with the central bank they, first, must know about the
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reaction function of the central bank and, second, be able to commit to a level of
fiscal spending.
The third and fourth cases are hybrids of the first two. In the third case the gov-
ernments do not coordinate, but each of the governments act as a Stackelberg leader
in the game with the central bank; and in the last case, the two fiscal authorities
coordinate, but they playa Cournot game with the monetary authorities.
3.1 The coordinated Stackelberg equilibrium
In this case, the governments coordinate their fiscal policy in order to minimize'"
2
LfS = ~L {"7y (Yjt)2 + "7g (gjt)2} ,
j=l
(25)
subject to the constraint (23), and they thus take into account how monetary policy
will react to changes in government spending.
The first order condition is given by:
o = "7y (J.t - ~) K (Yjt - Yit) + "7ggjt
gjt = - ~: (J.t - ~) K (Yjt - Yit) .
(26)
(27)
As a result, the fiscal authorities in country j will take both its own and the other
countries' output gap into account. Government spending will decrease when the
output gap in country j is higher than in country i, and at the same time, fiscal
authorities in country iwill increase spending. Both things will decrease the output
gap in country i, the latter through the fact that an increase in government spending
in country i will trigger the central bank to increase real interest rates, which will
decrease the output gap in country j. The size of the fiscal reaction will depend on
how effective fiscal policy is, which is measured by the factor (J.t - ~) K. The effect of
fiscal policy is reduced by the demand-spill-over - (1 - J.t) - and the monetary policy
141 concentrate on this symmetric solution since giving the two countries unequal weights will
make the average government spending and real interest rate depend on the individual parameters
and not only on their union-wide averages.
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reaction, which eliminates half of the fiscal effect. The size of fiscal spending will
also depend on the relative weight on fluctuations in government spending relative
to the fluctuations in the output gap, thus the fraction '!!JL. Fiscal spending will be
'rig
higher (lower) the higher (lower) the aversion is against fluctuations in the output
gap (government spending).
Taking union-wide average of the first order condition gives average government
spending and real interest rate equal to
g~S _ O
r~s - ~ (~7Tt + Ør; + V,t) ,
where the latter equation follows from equations (20) and (28). The average govern-
(28)
(29)
ment spending is thus zero, which - of course - follows from the fact that the fiscal
authorities have taken into account that the average output gap is pinned down by
the central bank objective (see equation 17). Thus if the average government spend-
ing were e.g. above zero, these would only result in a higher average real interest
rate without any effect on the average output gap. Therefore, since the governments
wish to minimize the fluctuations in government spending around zero, they will set
the average government spending equal to zero.
Government spending and the output gap for country j are given by:ls
cs
gjt = (30)
yCSjt (31)
Equations (30) and (31) demonstrate how fiscal spending and the output gap, re-
spectively, react to changes in the state variables in equilibrium. The first part
of each equations shows the average response. Since average output gap is pinned
down by the monetary policy rule, changing average fiscal policy will only lead to a
different mix of government spending and real interest rate and will not change the
output gap. Knowing this, the two fiscal authorities coordinate so that the average
15The calculations are given in the appendix.
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Figure 1: Coordinated Stackelberg Equilibrium
fiscal policy is zero. The second parts of equations (30) and (31) show the response
to country-specific changes (measured as deviations from the union average).
The equilibrium is shown in figure 1,16 which also plots the reaction to a positive
demand shock in country j (or a negative shock in country i). The fiscal author-
ities will thus use government spending to reduce the effect on the output gap of
idiosyncratic shocks. As seen from the figure, the fiscal spendings sum to zero, and
the equilibria will be on the dotted line denoted gjf = -gft.
16The reaction functions are of "reduced form" in the sense that I have eliminated the last stage
of the game, and simply described the model as a game between the two fiscal authorities. The
reaction functions are found inserting the output gap difference from equation (24) into the first
order condition and solving for fiscal spending. This gives:
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3.2 The uncoordinated Cournot equilibrium
In this case, the fiscal authorities not only take the action of the other fiscal authority
as given, but they also take the real interest rate - and thereby the country-specific
real exchange rate - as given when they set their fiscal spending. Minimizing the
government cost function (equation 21) subject to the aggregate demand function -
equation (8) - gives the first order condition
o (32)
(33)
Obviously, the government now does not take into account the effects of fiscal spend-
ing on the output gap in the other country in the monetary union. Besides, com-
paring equation (33) with equation (27) makes clear that, since the fiscal authorities
do not take the central bank reaction into account in the uncoordinated Cournot
game, they will react more aggressively than in the coordinated Stackelberg game to
an increase in the output gap. The reason is that fiscal policy seems more efficient
than it really is.
The average reaction function for the fiscal authorities is by:
(34)
Together with the monetary policy reaction function - equation (20) - this therefore
shows that there is a conflict of interest between the central bank and the fiscal
authorities. First, if the fiscal authorities wish to increase government spending to
spur activity, the central bank will react by increasing real interest rates. Second,
and likewise, if the central bank wishes to reduce real interest rates to increase
activity, the fiscal authorities will react by decreasing government spending. In the
literature, this is referred to as the" battle over the output gap" .
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Average government spending and the real interest rate are given by:
O
(35)
rue
t (36)
In equilibrium the government spending will thus be higher, the higher the core
inflation is; and the real interest rate will be higher, the higher the core inflation, the
foreign real interest rate and the domestic demand shocks are. Moreover, from the
equilibrium government spending, it is clear that if the government has no aversion
to increase government spending - thus if 7Jg = O, there are no limits on how much
the fiscal authorities will increase government spending in order to meet their goal
for the output gap.
The equilibrium is pictured in figure 2. The left hand side of the figure shows the
effects of a demand shock; and the right hand side the effect of an increase in core
inflation (a supply side shock). A demand shock shifts both the fiscal reaction func-
tion (inwards) and the monetary reaction function (upwards): and in total the real
interest rate increases and government spending remains unchanged. Turning to the
supply side disturbance, this only shifts the monetary reaction Junction (upwards)
and it results in an increase in both the real exchange rate and the government
spending.
Figure 2 and equation (35) show that there exists - in the language of Svensson
(1997) - a state-contingent governmental bias; and average government spending will
vary without any effect on the average output gap. As shown by Leitemo (op.cit.)
this was also so in the case of a single country with an independent central bank.
Nothing changes in a monetary union in this respect; and introducing demand-spill-
overs in the model discussed by Leitemo will give the same government spending as
here.
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Figure 2: The Fiscal and Monetary Policy Game
In this case, government spending and the output gap are given by:
(37)
yUCjt (38)
Therefore, the new thing about the monetary union set-up is that there will also
be a stabilization bias.!" This is seen by comparing equations (37) and (38) with
17In the appendix I show that among the strategic set-ups consider in this paper, the fiscal
authorities ex ante prefer the coordinated Stackelberg game. In order to conduct the welfare
analysis of the different game, I ask if the fiscal authorities ex ante would prefer the outcome in
the coordinated Stackelberg to the other strategic set-ups. Accordingly, I imagine an institutional
stage before the games are played; and in this stage the fiscal authorities choose which set-up they
would prefer.
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Figure 3: The uncoordinated Cournot equilibrium
equations (30) and (31). Using the latter pair of equations (with J1 > ~)gives:
Fiscal policy will thus - if J1 < 1 - react too much to idiosyncratic shocks so that
government spending will vary too much and the output gap will vary too little
compared to the coordinated Stackelberg equilibrium.l'' The reason is that the
fiscal authorities do not take into account that both the central bank and the other
fiscal authority also react to the shocks. I will return to how the bias is related to
these two factors below.
The equilibrium is shown in figure 3, which shows the "reduced form" reaction
181 use the coordinated Stackelberg game as the benchmark throughout this paper due to the
fact among the strategic set-ups, this game gives the lowest expected costs. This is shown in the
appendix.
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functions of the two fiscal authorities.!" Compared to figure 1 average government
spending no longer sums to zero. Furthermore, the reaction functions are steeper in
the uncoordinated Cournot game since the fiscal authorities react more aggressively
on factors affecting the output gap - including fiscal spending in the other country.
3.3 The uncoordinated Stackelberg equilibrium
In this case, the fiscal authorities do not coordinate but take each others action as
given. They are able to commit to a fiscal rule taking the monetary policy rule
into account, however, and therefore they act as Stackelberg leaders in the game
with the central bank. The fiscal authorities therefore minimize their cost function
(equation 21) subject to the constraint in equation (23). The first order condition
is then given by:
o TJy (/1 - ~) ~Yjt + TJggjt
gjt = - (/1- ~) ~: ~Yjt·
Due to the fact that the fiscal authorities take the monetary policy reaction into
(39)
(40)
consideration, they will react less to changes in the output gap compared to the
uncoordinated Cournot equilibrium discussed above. Still, however, they will not
take the other country's output gap into account.
The average government spending and the real interest rate are given by:
us ( 1) ~TJy"gt = /1-"2 ~ TJ
g
7ft
us 1 [( ( 1) ~TJy) 1" {3 * lrt = - 1+ /1- - -- -7ft + r + Ut .{3 2 I TJg I t
(41)
(42)
19In this case, the term "reduced" relates to the fact that I show the game in two dimensions,
since I have eliminated the central bank. To find the reaction functions I have inserted into the
first order condition for the output gap from equation (23) - where I have taken the monetary
policy reaction function into account - and then solved for fiscal spending. This gives:
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This shows that compared to the uncoordinated Cournot equilibrium the average
fiscal spending reacts less to changes in the underlying rate of inflation in equilib-
rium. The reason is that the fiscal authorities take into account that fiscal policy is
less effective due to the monetary policy response.
The government spending and the output gap in the uncoordinated Stackelberg
set-up are given by:
(43)
usYjt = (44)
Comparing equations (43) and (44) with equations (30) and (31) shows that fiscal
policy in this case reacts too little to idiosyncratic shocks and thus the output gap
varies too much. The key to understanding why this is so is the reduced-form
demand function in equation (23), and look at what happens following a negative
demand shock in country j. The output gap in country j decreases, while - due to
the sum of the fiscal and monetary channel (see text above) - the output gap in
country i increases. For that reason, the fiscal authorities in country j wishes to
increase government spending. This will, however, also decrease the output gap in
country i, which is too high; and thus, for the union as a whole there is a double
gain of the increase in fiscal spending in country j. In the uncoordinated Stackelberg
equilibrium, the fiscal authorities do not take this" second gain" into account, and
will thus choose a too small reaction.
3.4 The coordinated Cournot-equilibrium
In this game, the governments coordinate their fiscal policy in order to minimize
equation (25) subject to the aggregate demand functions in equation (8).The first
order conditions are given by
o - 'fJyK (J-LYjt + (1 - J-L) Yit) + 'fJggit
gjt - - 'fJy K (J-LYjt + (1 - J-L) Yit) .
'fJg
(45)
(46)
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The fiscal authorities react to changes in a weighted output gap, where the weights
are given by how the effect of government spending divided between the two coun-
tries. The governments will thus take into account the effect of fiscal spending both
on its own output gap and on the output gap of the other country. The reason is
that holding the real exchange rate constant, an increase in government spending in
country j with one unit will increase the output gaps in country j and i by J-tK, and
(1 - J-t) K" respectively.
The average government spending and the real interest rate will be given by
'rIy K, __
gce _ --7ftt 'rig 'Y
r~c = ~ (~ (1+ K ~;) ?Tt + /3r; + Ut) .
This implies that average government spending - and thus the bias - is higher in
(47)
(48)
this case than in the unconstrained Cournot case. This follows from the fact that
given an increase in the real interest rate, each of the fiscal authorities will increase
government spending both due to the impact on its own output gap and on the
output gap in the other country. Therefore, faced with an increase in core inflation,
the monetary authorities will have to increase the real interest rate more in order
to meet the monetary policy goal.
In this case government spending and the output gap in country j can be written
as:
gCCjt (49)
which implies that there will be no stabilization bias. This is due to the symmetry
(and the linearity) of the model, which makes the decision of the average government
spending independent of the distribution between the two countries. Since the fiscal
authorities coordinate they will choose the right mix of fiscal spending between the
two countries, but choose a too high average compared to the coordinated Stackel-
berg equilibrium. This is easily seen by rewriting the first order condition - equation
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(46) - as:
gCCjt - - ~: K, (J-LYjt - (1 - J-L)(2Yt - Yjt))
- - ~:K,(2(J-L-~)Yjt+2(1-J-L)Yt),
where in the first equality I have used the definition of the average output to sub-
stitute for the output gap in country i. The fiscal authorities choose the "correct"
reaction to the country-specific output gap, but react too much to changes in the
average.
3.5 Comparing the different set-ups
Table 1 shows which biases the different strategic set-ups generate. In all the set-
ups, except in the coordinated Stackelberg game, there will be an average bias in
fiscal spending; thus the fiscal authorities will react to an increase in the average
core inflation by increasing fiscal spending. Furthermore, in both cases where the
governments do not coordinate, there will be a stabilization bias as well: In the
uncoordinated Stackelberg game the fiscal authorities will react too little to idiosyn-
cratic shocks so that the output gap will vary too much, while in the uncoordinated
Cournot game they will react too much and the output gap will vary too little.
Table 1: The biases in the different set-ups
Game Average (state-contingent) bias Stabilization bias
Coordinated Stackelberg No No
Coordinated Cournot Yes No
Uncoordinated Stackelberg Yes Yes (Negative)
Uncoordinated Cournot Yes Yes (Positive)
The table might give the impression that the coordinated Cournot game is prefer-
able to both the uncoordinated games. However, this is not necessarily the case.
Comparing the average fiscal bias and the equilibrium changes in government spend-
ing to a change in the demand shock gives:
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The coordinated Cournot equilibrium does not generate a stabilization bias, but it
generates an average bias that is larger than in both the uncoordinated equilibria.
The ranking between the coordinated Cournot equilibrium and the two unco-
ordinated equilibia will depend both on the behavior of the different shocks - and
on relationship between them - and on the importance of the demand spill-overs
between the two countries. I will not go into detail about this here, but some fea-
tures seem worth mentioning. First, the more differently the two countries behave,
the more important it is to have a correct stabilization. Therefore, the coordinated
Cournot equilibrium will be preferable. This is also true if the variance of the aver-
age core inflation is small so that the average bias is small. Second, if the demand
spill-overs are high - i.e. J1 is close to one half - the stabilization bias will be of less
importance. The reason is that it will be difficult for the two countries to do affect
the demand in each of the countries separately.
To sum up: The most important lesson drawn from comparing the different
set-ups is that neither coordinating fiscal policy nor having the fiscal authorities
acting as Stackelberg leaders will necessarily be welfare improving.F'' Consequently,
an important factor for the attempts to coordinate fiscal policy to be successful, is
that there is a clear understanding of how the central bank is operating. Moreover,
there is a need of some instrument to make the fiscal authorities able to commit to
a level of fiscal spending. These two factors would make it possible that the fiscal
authorities act as Stackelberg leaders in the game with the central bank.
20This is easily shown by looking at two simple examples. First, if there are no idiosyncratic
disturbances - aWl = awz = aw and aUI = aU2 = au - the stabilization bias disappears and
the uncoordinated Cournot game will be preferable to the coordinated Cournot game. Second,
if there are no demand-linkages - Il = l - the uncoordinated Cournot game is preferable to the
uncoordinated Stackelberg game.
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4 Fiscal concern about real exchange rate vari-
ability
As mentioned above, Leitemo included the real exchange rate in the objective func-
tion of the government. This might be rationalized by the fact that a too fluctu-
ating real exchange rate may harm the tradeable part of the economy. As far as
the Cournot games are concerned, this will not change anything, since the fiscal
authorities take the Central Bank action - and therefore the real exchange rate - as
given when they choose fiscal spending. In the two Stackelberg games, on the other
hand, fiscal concern about real exchange rate variations will change the outcome,
and I will discuss both the games in turn.
The idea that the fiscal authorities also care about variations in the real exchange
rate might be expressed as
where 'fJe is the weight put on variations in the real exchange rate. As above, the
authorities are assumed to minimize the sum of the two cost functions in the coordi-
nated Stackelberg game and their own cost function - taking the action of the other
fiscal authority as given - in the uncoordinated Stackelberg game. In both cases,
the minimization is carried out subject to the reduced form output gap - equation
(23) - and the real exchange rate - equation (18).
4.1 The coordinated Stackelberg game with fiscal concern
about exchange rate variability
In this case the first order condition changes to:
'fJy (J.l- ~) ,.., (Yjt - Yit) + 'fJggjt - 'fJe~et
'fJy ( 1). ( ) n, ,..,( *)- 'fJ
g
J.l -"2 ,..,Yjt - Yit - 'fJ
g
(3 rt - rt ,
o = (51)
(52)
where I have used equation (19) to substitute for the real exchange rate in the
latter equality. As in the case above, the fiscal authorities take the output gaps in
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both countries into account. The new thing is that they will choose the optimal
mix between fiscal and monetary policyr" fiscal policy will react more the higher
the relative weight on real exchange rate stability - the fraction "Ie - and the more
"19
effective fiscal policy is relative to the effectiveness of monetary policy - the fraction
It is important to note that fiscal policy only will react to changes in the average
real exchange rate, and not to changes in the country-specific real exchange rates as
such. Therefore, if the country-specific real exchange rates change in opposite direc-
tion leaving the average real exchange rate constant, fiscal policy will not change. I
will return to this below.
To find the average government spending, I take the union average of equation
(52). Thereafter I insert for the real interest rate from equation (20). This gives
average government spending and real interest rate equal to
gCS _t - (53)
(54)
The average government spending will thus no longer be zero as it was the case
when the fiscal authorities gave no weight to avoiding real exchange rate variability.
Faced with an increase in the average core inflation or an in increase in the average
demand shock, the fiscal authorities will change government spending in order to
avoid "large" changes in the real exchange rate.
To find equilibrium government spending in country j, I do the same as above
and insert for the difference in the output gaps - calculated from equation (24). Then
I use the average government spending and the real interest rate from equations (53)
21To be precise, the government also choose an optimal mix between fiscal and monetary policy
in the case above; the mix dictated by letting 1Je = O.
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and (54). This gives government spending and the output gap as:
gCS _jt - (55)
cs
Yjt = (56)
Therefore, except from the fact that the average government spending is different,
both government spending and the output gap behaves exactly as in the case above
where the fiscal authorities did not care about real exchange rate variability. This
might seem strange at first glance since the weight put on avoiding real exchange
rate variability will not influence the output gap. The reason is as follows: first,
average output gap is still pinned down by the monetary policy goal, so the fiscal
authorities will not try to influence this. Second, the fiscal authorities can only
influence the real exchange rate through monetary policy changes to average fiscal
policy; and therefore, they are not able influence the country-specific real exchange
rates separately. This is why the first order condition above - equation (51) -
included only the average real exchange rate.
As far as the two Cournot games are concerned, the fiscal concern about real ex-
change rate variability will not affect how well the fiscal authorities react to idiosyn-
cratic disturbances. There will be another bias, though, since the fiscal authorities
will not choose the optimal mix of monetary and fiscal policy.
4.2 The uncoordinated Stackelberg game with fiscal con-
cern about exchange rate variability
In this case the first order condition changes to:
O = (57)
(58)
Compared to the coordinated game, the fiscal authorities in this case - as in the
case with "'e = O- do not react to changes in the output gap in the other country.
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Furthermore, they react less to changes in the average real exchange rate since they
do not take into account the effect on the other country; and last, they react to
changes in domestic prices, which will affect the real exchange rate.
Taking the union-average of equation (58), using equation (17) for the output
gap and equation (20) for the real exchange rate, the average government spending
and real interest rate might be found to be:
gUS _ 1 ( 1) 7]y I'\, ~ I'\, ( 1~ )
t - 1+ ! l TIe 1'\,2 11 -"2 -:;;17ft - 2j32~ + 1'\,2 -;:;7ft + Ut
2(:3LTlg .'g TIe I
rrs = 2T11 2 [2j37]g (!7rt+Ut) +21'\,2j37]y (11- -21) !7rt] +r;.
2j3 #! + I'\, 7]e' 7]e'
(59)
(60)
Consequently, average government spending now consist of two parts. The first
part is due to the average bias as in the case above, which is now reduced. This
is so because the fiscal authorities will react less to a change in the output gap.
The second part is due to the trade-off between real exchange rate and government
spending variability. Compared to the coordinated equilibrium described above, the
trade-off is distorted since the governments do not take into account the effect on
the other country.
Inserting for the output gap from equation (24) into the first order condition and
using the average government spending from equation (41) gives:
(61)
Therefore, the equilibrium output gap will be given by:
us
Yjt = (62)
The effect for the stabilization bias of introducing fiscal care about real exchange
rate variability is that nothing happens as far as the reaction on demand shocks are
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concerned, while the fiscal authorities will react even less to idiosyncratic supply
side shocks.
5 Concluding remarks
The paper discusses coordination problems in a monetary union. The main findings
are that lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal policy leads to a state-
contingent bias and that lack of coordination between the fiscal authorities willlead
to a stabilization bias. The latter refers to the fact that the fiscal authorities do not
react correctly to idiosyncratic shocks, and the nature of the stabilization bias will
depend on whether the fiscal authorities act as Stackelberg leaders in the game with
the central bank.
The most famous monetary union is the European Monetary Union consisting
of most of the countries in the European Union. The European Central Bank is an
independent institution with price stability as its major goal; and thus the set-up
used in this model should in principle be able to shed some light upon the conduct
of fiscal policy by the different European fiscal authorities.
Except from the positive issues - that fiscal policy on average might react too
much to factors driving core inflation and that the fiscal response to Idiosyncratic
shocks might be distorted - the model also points at some normative issues, namely
about coordination of fiscal policy. The first issue regards the rather obvious fact
that the central bank will only react to average developments in the union. There-
fore, the goal of the fiscal authorities should be to react to idiosyncratic disturbances.
The second issue regards the attempts to coordinate fiscal policy within the union;
and the model discussed here points towards two important factors for such attempts
to be successful. First, there must be a clear understanding of how the central bank
is operating; and, second, there is a need of some instrument to make the fiscal
authorities able to commit to a level of fiscal spending. This would make it possible
for the fiscal authorities to act as Stackelberg leaders in the game with the central
bank. If this is not the case, coordinating fiscal policy within the monetary union
might lead to an increase in average fiscal spending, which is offset by the central
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bank; and to biased reactions of the fiscal authorities to idiosyncratic disturbances.
6 Appendix
6.1 Fiscal spending and the output gap in the different
strategic set-ups
6.1.1 Coordinated Stackelberg
To find equilibrium government spending in country j, note that using equation (24)
the difference in output gaps between the two countries can be written as:
Yjt - Yit = 4 (J.i - ~) [li: (gjt - gt) + Ujt - Ut - f3 (7fjt. - 7ft)]. (63)
Inserting this into the first order condition (equation 26) and using gjt -git,
government spending in country j can be written as:
gCSjt (64)
(65)
By inserting the latter equality into equation (24) and using the fact that gt = 0, I
can find the output gap in country j:
yCsjt
which is the equation given in the text.
148
6.1.2 Uncoordinated Cournot
To find the government spending in the two countries and the real interest rate, I
have to take into account how the real exchange rate is affected by the average gov-
ernment spending. Taking the union-average of the first order condition - equation
(32), inserting for the average output gap - equation (13), and solving for average
government spending gives
(68)
where I have used equation (19) to substitute for the real exchange rate in the second
equality. Hence, the latter is the average fiscal authority reaction function given in
the text.
Using equations (17) and (20), the average government spending and the real
interest rate can be written as:
o
(69)'Ucgt
r
uc _
t - (70)
Inserting for the output gap from equation (24) into the first order condition -
equation (32) - gives
'Tly/11{, ( -~7rt + 2 (/1- ~) [I{, (gjt - gt) + Ujt - Ut - !3 (7fjt - 7ft)]) + 'Tlggjt = 0,
and therefore, using the average government spending from equation (35), equilib-
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rium government spending can be written as:
and the equilibrium output gap is found using the latter equality above and equation
(24).
6.1.3 Uncoordinated Stackelberg
Taking the union-average of equation (39) and inserting for the average output gap
from equation (17), the average government spending and real interest rate are given
by:
( 1) 1~O = -"ly f-l- 2 "'-:;1ft + "lggjt
UB ( 1) «o.:
gt = f-l - 2 -:;"l
g
1ft
UB 1 [( ( 1) '""lY) 1~ (3 * lTt = - 1+ f-l- - -- -1ft + T + Ut .
(3 2 I "lg "I t
Next, inserting for the output gap from equation (24) into the first order condi-
tion (equation 39) and using the average government spending from equation (41)
(73)
(74)
gives:
(75)
(76)
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6.1.4 Coordinated Cournot
Using the first order condition (45), the aggregate demand equation (23), and av-
erage government spending from equation (47), government spending in country j
can be written as:
6.2 Pay-off comparisons
To calculate the costs for the fiscal authorities in the two uncoordinated equilibria, I
use the first order conditions - equations (33) and (40) - to write the loss in period
tas:
Ljt =
7Iy (1 + JL2K2~:) (yjn2
~y (
1 + ('" - D'~:",)(Yi')' ,
(79)
(80)
for the uncoordinated Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria, respectively. Next, I
insert for the output gap from equations (38) and (44). This gives:
Lj% = 7Iy(1+JL2K2~:)(Yt)2 (81)
( )
71 (7)g + JL2K2)
+2 JL-~ y 7)y [u't-Ut-!3(7f't-7f't)]Yt
2 ~ + 2JL (JL - l) K2 J J t
7)y 2
( 1)2 7Ig(~+JL2K2) 2}+ JL-2 2[Ujt-Uit-!3(7fjt-7fit)] ,(~ + 2JL (JL - ~) K2)
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and
Lusjt (82)
written as:22
Les ( es)2 (17y)2 ( . 1)2 2 (es es)2jt = 17y Yjt + 17g 17
g
fl - "2 ti, Yjt - Yit ,
for the coordinated Stackelberg game, and
Lj~ = ~y (yj;)' + ~g G:r K' (l')Jjt+ (1 - 1') Yit)',
for the coordinated Cournot game. Using the output gaps from equations (31) and
(83)
(84)
(50), the losses can be expressed as:
(85)
and
Lj~ 17y (1+ ~:ti,2) (Yt)2 (86)
( 1) 17y (~ + 2 (fl - ~) ti,2)+2 fl-- [u·t-u·t-!3(7r·t-7r·t)]Yt2 ~ + 4 (fl _ 1.) 2 ti,2 J t J t
7Jy 2
( 1)2 17g [ 2+ fl-- u·t-u·t-!3(7r·t-7r·)]2 ~ + 4 (fl _ 1.) 2 ti,2 J t J tt·
7Jy 2
22As for the two uncoordinated equilibria, I use the respective first order conditions, hence
equations (27) and (46).
152
In order to find the difference in ex post expected costs between the coordinated
Stackelberg game and the other strategic set-ups, I would normally have to proceed
as follows: First, calculate the differences using the equations above; and, second,
take the expected value. However, due to the symmetry of the model, it suffices
to calculate the average loss for the two countries. The reason is that with equal
probability, the two fiscal authorities will face the loss for either country j and i.
For the coordinated Stackelberg equilibrium the average cost is given by:
L~CS -t -
and therefore the second therm in equation (85) disappear. Consequently, the dif-
ferences with the coordinated Stackelberg game and the other strategic set-ups can
be calculated as:
~ -._
LCS _ LUC
t t
A sufficient condition in order to make the term in square brackets negative, IS
that f.t < 1. Hence, the coordinated Stackelberg is preferable to the uncoordinated
Cournot equilibrium.
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Moreover,
Les _ LUS
t t
and therefore, because the term in the square brackets is negative as long as fj > ~,
the coordinated Stackelberg game is preferable to the uncoordinated Stackelberg
game.
Last,
~ ~Les _ Lee
t t
which is negative. Accordingly, the coordinated Stackelberg game is also preferable
to the coordinated Cournot game.
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